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Trade unions played an important role in South Africa’s transition from apartheid in 
1994 and continue to play a very public role in the South African economy. Trade 
unions are found to have had an increasingly positive effect on members’ wages, 
although it appears that this increase has resulted in part from changes in the 
composition of union membership. Unions also had an inequality-reducing character, 
with union premiums for workers at the lower end of the wage distribution being 
greater than those for workers at the higher end of the wage distribution. 
 
 
Keywords: Wage level and structure, Trade unions, Objectives, Structure and effect 






   3
INTRODUCTION 
The importance and complex nature of trade unions have rendered them an important 
subject of investigation in a range of research fields (Card, Lemieux and Riddell, 2004: 
528). South African trade unions in recent years have been particularly vocal in their 
demands for unionised workers and indeed in their opinions on economic issues in South 
Africa. South African unions are therefore often in the public eye and are seen by many 
as creating unnecessary rigidity in the labour market. (Business Day 14 April 2008).  
Unions engage in three broad categories of activities: traditional wage setting activities, 
political activities; and maintaining and influencing relationships between their members 
and employers. Union activity may result in increased wages, which implies possible 
changes in wage equality within markets and between workers. An important aspect of 
the South African labour market is the fact that union wage benefits are extended to 
nonunionised workers through the Industrial Council system (Butcher and Rouse, 2001: 
349-350).  
The supposed influence of unions on wages, productivity, unemployment and economic 
growth warrants investigation of and the quantification of the impact of unions, especially 
in the case of South Africa in which trade unions and the rigidity implied by their actions 
create some contention in both the economic and political arena. This study investigates 
the estimated union wage premium (the excess of unionised workers’ wages over than of 
their nonunion counterparts) in South Africa for the period 1995 to 2005. The aim is not 
exact measurement of the union premium or union wage gap, but to disentangle the broad 
trend of the premium so as to obtain an indication of the extent and trend of union power 
over the last decade (Hildreth 1999). 
Section 1 presents a theoretical discussion of the influence of unions on wages and briefly 
examines empirical research on South Africa. Section 2 discusses specific econometric 
problems  pertaining  to  the  measurement  of  the  union  premium  and  potential 
compensation  for  these  problems.  Five  econometric  methods  are  discussed:  Ordinary 
least  squares  (OLS)  regression,  the  treatment  effects  model,  the  switching  model, 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the union premium and quantile regression. Section 3 
reviews the institutional character of unions and collective bargaining in South Africa, 
providing  a  historical  sketch  and  descriptive  analysis  of  South  African  union 
membership. The estimated union wage premium for 1995 to 2005 is discussed in section 
4. Section 5 concludes.   
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1. UNIONS AND WAGES 
Wages within a specific firm or industry are determined primarily by factors affecting the 
demand for and supply of labour, mediated within the institutional realm of the market 
and by the resulting “power struggle” between employers and employees. 
Although unions influence many areas of the economy, their role in wage negotiations 
attracts  the  most  attention.  Unions  influence  earnings  by  compressing  wages  within 
unionised sectors and by decreasing wage inequality (although the fact that unions aim to 
increase  wages  for  members  could  enhance  inequality  between  workers  with  similar 
characteristics).  Wages  play  a  pivotal  role  in  perceptions  of  fairness,  equality  and 
efficiency within a country, and so the influence that unions have on wages is a highly 
contentious  issue.  Indeed,  the  relationship  between  unions  and  earnings  is  often 
controversial. (Altman, 2005: 1). This chapter discusses the theoretical background to this 
relationship before discussing empirical research on South Africa.  
 
1.1 UNIONS AND EARNINGS: UNION WAGE PREMIUM 
Fang and Verma (2002) distinguish between two measures of the union wage premium 
(the excess of union workers’ wages over that of their nonunion counterparts). The “raw” 
union premium refers to the gross union premium independent of human or workplace 
influences. The “adjusted” premium is however a more accurate reflection of the union 
premium.  The  adjusted  premium  reflects  comparable  differences  across  firms,  taking 
account of human capital and firm specific characteristics (Feinberg-Daniela and Lonti, 
2006: 29). 
The origin of the union premium and its effect on profits is the focus of the analysis of 
this premium. Freeman and Medoff (1984) understand the union premium to result from 
rents extracted from monopolies in exclusive positions.  Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) 
extend the possible origin of the union premium to three sources. The first of these is the 
possibility  that  union  workers  are  more  productive  than  nonunion  workers,  therefore 
increasing profits for firms which in turn results in higher wages. If this is the case, the 
union premium implies little penalty in terms of employment. Secondly, union workers 
may be concentrated primarily in an environment or industry in which significant profits 
are  made,  resulting  in  higher  remuneration  for  workers.  The  concentration  of  union 
workers in such industries may be the result of either the choice of employers to hire 
mainly union members, or of workers’ job choice. Either way, there seems to be limited 
injury  to  either  worker  of  employer.  However,  increased  union  density  can  cause  a 
potential union wage premium.  The third possibility is that the wage premium is a “tax 
on  normal  profits”,  implying  adverse  effects  for  investment,  employment  and  price   5
levels.  This  often  forms  the  basis  for  criticism  of  union  activity  (Blanchflower  and 
Bryson, 2004). 
 
1.2 THE UNION PREMIUM IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Mwabu  and  Schultz  (1997)  use  quantile  regression  on  1993  data,  finding  the  union 
premium for workers in the lowest decile of the wage distribution to be eight times larger 
than that received by union workers in the highest decile of the wage distribution. Their 
findings support the notion that low earning workers derive the most benefits from union 
participation, as indicated by the larger union premium they receive. 
Hofmeyr and Lucas (2001) calculate an increase in the union premium for black urban 
males from 8 percent in 1985 to 26.5 percent in 1993, adjusted for personal and industry 
characteristics.  This  increase  could  be  the  result  of  a  change  in  either  membership 
composition  or  in  the  rewards  to  workers’  productive  characteristics.  The  authors 
conclude that the increase can be ascribed to differences in earnings structure between 
union and nonunion workers, regardless of attributes of individual workers (Hofmeyr and 
Lucas, 2001: 686). 
Butcher and Rouse (2000) observe a union premium of 20 percent for black workers and 
10 percent for white workers, using the 1995 October Household Survey
1. An industrial 
council premium of 6 to 10 percent is estimated for black nonunion workers, acting as a 
rough  measure  of  the  extension  of  union  benefits  to  nonunion  members  through 
collective  bargaining.    However,  despite  this  extension,  union  workers  still  earn 
marginally  more  than  nonunion  workers  do  if  both  groups  are  covered  by  industrial 
council  agreements:  union  workers  earn  a  uniform  wage  premium,  regardless  of 
industrial  council  coverage.  Butcher  and  Rouse  (2000)  report  that  the  least  skilled 
workers benefit most from both industrial council agreements and union membership.  
Using data from household surveys in 1993, 1995 and 1999, Hofmeyr (2002) finds a 
significant wage differential between formal sector black male union members and those 
who do not belong to unions. Hofmeyr concludes that union workers have been able to 
maintain their wage and employment levels, relative to their nonunion counterparts, 
indicating some protection for workers belonging to unions. According to this study, the 
labour markets appear to be segmented with restricted movement between segments, 
possibly implying an inefficient allocation of resources and human capital.  
                                                           
1 The authors make use of gross monthly income rather than hourly earnings as an earnings measure which 
may be the source of differences between their estimates and those estimated in other studies of the same 
time period (Butcher and Rouse 2000:19).   6
2. STATISTICAL THEORY & METHODOLOGIES 
 
The measurement of wage premiums (be it union premiums, gender premiums etc) is 
conditional  on  the  circumstances  within  an  era  and  often  reflects  the  contemporary 
research of the time. (Fang and Verma, 2002). The best method for the measurement of 
the  union  premium  is  still  under  debated.  The  remainder  of  the  chapter  discussed 
different econometric techniques used in the estimation of the union premium. 
 
2.1 SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS 
In his seminal paper, Heckman (1979) introduces a solution to the problem of sample 
selection bias. In the case of selection into a certain sample, whether by choice (self-
selection) or not (employment selection, for example), the estimation acquired using OLS 
will  produce  inconsistent  results.  Therefore  using  non-random  samples  will  result  in 
biased  population  estimates
2.  Selection  may  be  based  on  observable  or  unobservable 
characteristics. 
The decision to join a union may contain some sample selection bias since the sample of 
wage earners from which union members come excludes non-participants in the labour 
market, regardless of their level of education, experience and so on. The coefficients 
observed  are  therefore  biased  as  the  influence  of  other  earnings  determinants  is  not 
accurately represented (Lewis, 1986: 1140).  
Heckman  (1979)  proposes  a  selection  term,  derived  from  a  binary  response  model 
(probit), to control for selection into a particular state. From this preliminary estimation, 
an Inverse Mills Ratio (λ)
3 is calculated and included as an additional variable in the 
                                                           
2 An example is the modeling of earnings, which is only observed for those with employment, restricting 
one to a non-random sample. 









= ˆ   
where 
i Z is a  1 × m  vector of explanatory variables (observations) for individual i in the probit  
γ  is a  1 × m  vector of estimated parameters from probi ( ) x φ  is a standard normal density function 
( ) x Φ  is a cumulative standard normal distribution function   7
earnings function (Heckman, 1979 and Lee, 1979). The ratio included corrects for over- 
and  underestimation  of  the  influence  of  individual  observations  and  aims  to  correct 
inconsistencies of coefficients by treating it as an omitted variable problem (Wooldridge, 
2002: 247). 
 
2.1.1 Relevance of the Selection Term 
The  appropriateness  of  the  selection  term  is  often  questioned,  however,  since  the 
selection term is decidedly sensitive to the specification of the model. Furthermore, there 
is substantial variance in results (Lewis, 1986; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). Selection 
models  are  also  questioned,  since  selection  may  be  double-sided  but  in  opposite 
directions for workers with high and low measured skill. Positive selection occurs for 
lower-skilled  workers  since  they  stand  to  benefit  more  from  union  membership,  and 
negative selection for skilled workers. This begs the question whether some part of the 
wage premium should be attributed to the correlation between earnings and unobserved 
skills factors. 
 
2.1.2 Endogenous Union Status 
Union premiums are typically estimated using OLS with a union dummy variable that 
captures the effect of unions on earnings. However, research has evolved to view union 
membership as an endogenous decision. Evidence exists which indicates that union status 
may indeed involve some form of self-selection and therefore that the independent choice 
variable  is  correlated  with  some  unobservable  variables  captured  by  the  error  term. 
Furthermore, the possibility of reverse causality between the union decision and potential 
earnings  exists.  An  endogenous  union  membership  decision  renders  error  terms 
heteroscedastic, implying biased OLS estimates. 
Although the reverse causality between wage and union membership is recognized, it is 
of limited importance on an aggregate level. Unions do contend for higher wages for their 
members, but they are unable to increase the level of earnings for the entire workforce. It 
is  therefore  safe  to  assume  causality  to  run  primarily  from  earnings  to  unionization 
(Hirsch, 1980). 
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As discussed earlier, sample selection models suffer shortcomings and so despite the fact 
that endogenous union status is theoretically conceivable, econometrics techniques fail to 
measure it in any satisfactory manner. 
 
2.2 ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
Five econometric techniques are used in this paper to track the union premium in South 
Africa between 1995 and 2005. These techniques include OLS regression, the treatment 
effects  model,  the  switching  model  ,  a  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  and  quantile 
regression. 
 
2.2.1 OLS Regression 
OLS wage regression (in this case) estimates the proportional impact of variables on 
wages (Blackburn, 2005).  
log  i i i i U X a W η δ β + + + =                  (1) 
Equation 1 relates the log of hourly earnings to household and workers characteristics 
(Xij)  and  captures  the  effect  that  union  membership  might  have  on  hourly  earnings 
through the inclusion of a dummy variable (Ui). The error term is  i η ~ N( )
2 , 0 δ . 
OLS only allows an intercept shift between union and nonunion workers, however, and 
so  rewards  are  not  allowed  to  differ  between  union  and  nonunion  workers.  OLS 
estimation also treats union membership as an exogenous variable, therefore running the 
risk of simultaneity bias. This method does not allow the measurement or estimation of 
differences in unobservable characteristic between union and nonunion workers (Addison 
and  Hirsch,  1986:  124).  Lewis  (1986)  suggests  that  OLS  estimates  of  the  union 
coefficient  (δ)  will  be  biased  upwards  because  higher  wages  result  in  higher  quality 
workers  subsequent  to  screening.  This  upward  bias  therefore  implies  a  positive 
correlation  between  omitted  variables  and  union  membership.  OLS  estimates  should 
therefore be regarded as the upper bound of the estimated mean union premium (Lewis, 
1986). Despite the aforementioned drawbacks of OLS regression, it serves as a useful 
method to which to compare other techniques
4.  
                                                           
4  Preconditions  apply  to  the  OLS  technique  and  estimates  are  only  consistent  if  the  error  term  is 
independently distributed from the regressors. OLS assumes errors from regressions are homoscedastic and 
are normally distributed. Heteroscedasticity causes inefficiency. Blackburn (2005) concludes that log-wage 
models  using  OLS  estimations  may  overstate  the  union  impact  by  as  much  as  20-30  percent  due  to   9
 
2.2.2 Treatment Effects Model 
The treatment effects model allows for endogenous union status, therefore controlling for 
the  possibility  of  correlation  between  the  independent  choice  variable  and  some 
unobserved variables captured by the error term, and the possibility of reverse causality 
between union membership and potential earnings. As with OLS, however, returns to 
productive  characteristics  are  assumed  constant  over  union  and  nonunion  workers, 
indicating an intercept effect.
η δ β α + + + = i i i U X W log
 
log 
η δ β α + + + = i i i U X W log
                                          
  (2) 
According to this model, union status (Ui) is endogenous. The model therefore differs 
from  standard  OLS  where  Ui  enters  as  an  exogenous  dummy  variable  (Azam  and 
Rospabe,  2005).  In  contrast,  endogenous  union  membership  is  modeled  as  a  latent 
variable Ui
*, which in this case is an observed decision. Ui
* is presumed to be a linear 
function of a set of exogenous variables Zi(which includes at least one variable relating to 
union status and not to earnings), and a random component, ui ,  
i i i u Z U + =
∗ γ , 













  and ( ) i i u ε ;  ~ bivariate normal [ ] i i ρ δε , , 1 , 0 , 0  
A number of problems arise. If unobservable variables influencing earnings are correlated 
with the union membership decision, 0 ≠ i ρ , and self-selection results. The sample will 
therefore not be random and the estimates obtained using OLS regression will be biased. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
heteroscedasticity  and  strongly  doubts  the  efficiency  of  “robust”  standard  errors  in  correcting  for  this 
problem (Blackburn 2005:3). His study also rejects the normality assumption of the error terms, indicating 
biased estimates (although these biases are considered small in magnitude). Blackburn proposes the use of 
quasi maximum-likelihood methods that impose less stringent requirements on the error terms and remain 
consistent even if the underlying distribution is incorrect. 
   10
Union participation may be accounted for by using a binary mechanism in the form of a 
probit. From this, a selection term like that of Heckman (1979) and Lee (1978) may be 
derived  and  included  in  the  earnings  regression  to  correct  for  the  sample  selection 
problem (Booth, 1986; Hirsch, 1980; Deery and Decieri, 1990). The earnings regression 
therefore becomes  




















+ + = '                               (3) 
The exact union premium for both the treatment effects model and the OLS method may 
be calculated as 
1 ) ˆ exp( ˆ − = δ j u  
Since  both  these  models  draw  from  OLS  estimation,  they  suffer  from  the  same 
drawbacks. The model requires consideration of the selectivity correction term in the 
earnings function. If the correction term (λ) is set to zero, the union premium may be 
interpreted  as  the  gap  between  predicted  earnings  conditional  on  mean  union 
characteristics and those conditional on mean nonunion characteristics. This assumes that 
samples are drawn at random from the population. The inclusion of the selection term in 
the earnings function serves only to obtain unbiased estimates of coefficients. 
Alternatively, correlation between the error terms of the earnings equation and those of 
the  selection  equation  may  occur.  In  this  case,  the  selection  term  will  not  be  zero, 
indicating  the  influence  of  unobservable  factors  on  both  the  earnings  and  decision 
processes.  The  mean  value  of  the  correction  term  is  therefore  integrated  into  the 
estimation of the union premium. Observed and unobserved characteristics are therefore 
held  constant  when  earnings  are  compared.  This  results  in  a  potentially  broader 
interpretation  of  the  union  premium,  although  some  of  the  variables  which  are  held 
constant  are  ultimately  unidentified.  Certain  conclusions  about  attribute  differences 
between  union  members  and  nonunion  members  may  be  reached  as  a  result  of  the 
inclusion of the mean correction term. These conclusions are however conditional on 
estimated values of unobserved variables, particularly in the case of a binary selection 
instrument (Hofmeyr and Lucas, 2001: 707). 
 
2.2.3 Switching Model 
Both the treatment effects and the OLS models discussed assume the βj coefficients to be 
the  same  for  both  unionised  and  nonunionised  workers,  implying  that  workers’ 
productive characteristics are rewarded the same way in both sectors. A switching model   11
corrects for this by allowing separate earnings regimes for the different sectors, which is 















i X W η β + = 1                 (5) 
A switching model will capture the union premium more accurately in sectors having 
different earnings structures.  
The switching model estimates the union premium by  
( ) [ ] 1 exp ˆ − − = n
n u
j X u β β  
X may be a vector of mean characteristics from either the union sample, the nonunion 
sample or a pooled sample (Azam and Rospabe, 2005: 26)
5. Using the nonunion vector as 
the reference group means that the union premium should be interpreted as the additional 
income that nonunion members would earn if they joined a union given their existing 
attributes. If the union vector is used it means that the union premium represents the 
amount  by  which  union  members’  income  would  fall  in  the  absence  of  union 
membership, given their existing attributes. 
 
2.2.4 Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
The  traditional  Oaxaca-Blinder  (1973)  decomposition  method  is  widely  used  in 
economics,  primarily  to  measure  discrimination.  The  technique  compares  the  wage 
structures of two distinct groups and decomposes the mean wage gap between the groups 
into  a  component  which  can  be  attributed  to  differences  in  the  average  productive 
characteristics of the two groups (the “explained” component) and the component that 
results  from  differences  in  the  compensation  structures  between  the  groups  (the 
“unexplained”  component).  The  unexplained  component  is  deemed  an  estimate  of 
discrimination  in  the  market  (Oaxaca  and  Ransom,  1999:  1).  In  this  study,  the 
unexplained component is understood to be the union effect.  
As in the switching model, potential complications enter with the choice of reference 
group (union or nonunion). Unlike in the switching model, however, the results obtained 
vary significantly depending on the group chosen as a reference group.  
                                                           
5 The choice of sector does not influence the results obtained.   12
β β ∆ ′ + ′ ∆ = − n u X X n W u W ) ln( ) ln(               (6) 
β β ∆ ′ + ′ ∆ = − u n X X n W u W ) ln( ) ln(               (7) 
Equation  6  assumes  that  union  wages  will  prevail  in  the  absence  of  discrimination 
because  the  union  earnings  structure  is  used  as  reference  weight  for  differences  in 
characteristics. Equation 7 assumes that nonunion wages will prevail in the absence of 
discrimination. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004: 6) refer to this as the “familiar index number 
problem”. Neumark (1988) explains that the choice of reference group is contingent on 
the nature of discrimination, implying the possibility that another earnings structure in 
addition to the binary choice categories might prevail in the absence of discrimination
6. 
Decomposition using the pooled earnings structure is therefore proposed to result in a 
more adequate reflection of competitive structures in the market (Neumark, 1988; Oaxaca 
and Ransom, 1994). It also produces the lowest standard errors for estimated differences.  
 
2.2.5 Quantile Regression 
Quantile regression is used to investigate whether unions reduce inequality in the wages 
received  by  workers
7.  The  method  of  quantile  regression  minimizes  the  absolute 
deviations of observations from the regression line (Kuan, 2004: 1). By minimizing the 
absolute deviations rather than the sum of the squared deviations, quantile regression is 
less sensitive to outliers, which do not have as much leverage on the estimates obtained 
using quantile regression as they do using OLS regression.  
                                                           
6 “Decomposing the wage differential between two groups to estimate wage discrimination should not be 
considered  an  algebraic  exercise  independent  of  the  nature  of  the  underlying  discriminatory  behavior” 
(Neumark 1988:294). 
7 Regression is broadly  understood to be the quantification of  the relationship that exists between the 
dependent (or response) variable and the explanatory variables (or covariates) (Yu, Lu and Stander, 2003: 
332). Because ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is run for the whole sample, this method reports the 
mean relationship for the entire sample. OLS regression minimizes the sum of the squared errors in the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable and so the estimate which it yields is the mean function 
of  the  conditional  distribution  of  the  response  variable  (Kuan,  2004:  1).  OLS  regression  is  therefore 
inadequate if one is interested in investigating what is happening in different parts of the sample (or in this 
particular case, at different points in the wage distribution) (Yu et al, 2003: 332). One characteristic of OLS 
regression that is particularly problematic is its sensitivity to outliers. Because OLS minimizes the sum of 
squared residuals, larger errors result in a “loss” in the precision of OLS estimates (Gujarati, 2003: 19)  
   13
Quantile  regression  is  basically  the  fitting  of  a  line  to  data  points  so  that  a  given 
proportion of the data points lie below the line and the rest lie above the line (Deaton, 
1997: 79). If, for example a quantile regression is run at the 80
th percentile, then 80% of 
the data points will lie below the regression line and 20% of the data points will lie above 
the line. Therefore, this regression is run for the 80
th percentile of the error structure. For 
this paper, quantile regressions are run at the 20
th percentile, at the 50
th percentile and at 
the  80
th  percentile.  In  this  process,  deviations  of  the  observations  below  the  fitted 
regression  line  (i.e.  the  bottom  20%  of  observations  of  the  wage  distribution)  are 
weighted four times as heavily as those 80% of observations above the fitted regression 
line (at a ratio of 4:1). Similarly, the quantile regressions run at the 80
th percentile are 
regressions run for the entire sample weighting the deviations of the top 20% of the wage 
distribution more heavily than those of the remainder of the wage distribution below the 
line.  
An advantage of quantile regression is that this method makes it possible to formulate 
hypotheses that “suggest interactions between the residuals and the covariates such that 
the effect of a covariate will differ for individuals, depending on their position in the 
distribution  of  residuals”  (Schultz  and  Mwabu,  1998:  685).  We  are  therefore  able  to 
provide a less “parametrically  restrictive” description of the way in which covariates 
affect the entire distribution of wages, illuminating the hypotheses on the mechanisms 
generating (in this particular case) wage inequality.  
 
 
3. SOUTH AFRICAN UNIONS IN CONTEXT 
 
3.1 INDUSTRIAL COUNCILS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR 
MARKET: THE EXTENSION OF UNION WAGE BENEFITS 
 
3.1.2 Industrial Councils in the South African Labour Market: The Extension of 
Union Wage Benefits 
An  important  aspect  of  the  South  African  labour  market  that  is  pertinent  to  any 
investigation of the impact of trade unions is the fact that union wage benefits are not 
extended exclusively to trade unions members (Butcher and Rouse, 2001: 349-350). The 
industrial council system that exists in South Africa provides for the extension of union 
wage and working condition stipulations to some non-unionised workers.    14
It is therefore important to acknowledge that any investigation into the effect that trade 
unions have on wage structures and wage distribution in South Africa should not be 
limited to the investigation of paid-up union members alone or as distinct from workers 
who do not belong to a trade union. However, data containing the number of industrial 
councils that are currently in existence as well as how many workers are covered by 
different industrial councils are difficult to get hold of. Even when the data do exist, they 
are often imprecise. Industrial council coverage is therefore not controlled for in this 
analysis, although it is acknowledged that industrial councils have the effect of extending 
union wage premia and benefits to non-unionised workers. This study is limited to unions 
and the extent of their influence independently of industrial council coverage.  
 
3.2 SOUTH AFRICAN APPLICATION 
3.2.1 Data 
Fifteen data sets are used in this study, namely the October Household Survey (OHS) for 
1995 to 1999, and the biannual Labour Force Survey (LFS) for 2000 to 2005. The sample 
is limited to black male workers
8 because the union effect is most pronounced among this 
group.  It  is  also  presumed  that  workers  from  different  race  groups  have  difference 
earnings structures, rendering it appropriate to estimate separate functions for each group 
(Hofmeyr and Lucas, 2001; Moll, 1993). Further, by focusing on one demographic group, 
it is possible to abstract from issues of racial and gender discrimination and to isolate the 
union effect. Only workers employed in the formal sector
9 are included in the study. 
Further, workers earnings a monthly income in excess of R200 000 are excluded since 
they are regarded as outliers
10. 
 
3.2.2 Union Coverage and Composition 
3.2.2.1 Union Density 
                                                           
8 This is a strategy also adopted by other authors in the field, such as Hofmeyr and Lucas (2001) and Moll 
(1993).  
9 Workers employed in the informal sector, domestic workers, subsistence agriculture workers and the self-
employed are excluded.  
10 Additional errors may exist in the data, namely the omission of fringe benefits, time used to measure 
earnings, nonrandom samples and the misclassification of union participation.   15
Table 2 and figure 1 report union density amongst employed black workers between 1995 
and 2005. It is evident that union density (as a percentage of the employed labour force) 
peaked in 1997, after which it appeared to decline. This was the case for both male and 
female workers. The decline in union membership post-1997 may perhaps be explained 
in  part  by  the  disincentive  to  join  unions  created  by  the  extension  of  bargaining 
agreements  to  nonunionised  workers
11.  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  signify  a 
decline in union power. Union power should rather be judged by the ability of unions to 
increase the wages of their members.  
TABLE 2: UNION DENSITY FOR BLACK EMPLOYED WORKERS 
 
   
Total 





%  Black Males 
Female Union 
%  Black Females 
OHS1995  38.97  3,501,996  36.22  1,580,069 
OHS1996  36.18  2,906,060  32.57  1,383,022 
OHS1997  48.10  2,619,650  47.33  1,103,032 
OHS1998  46.08  2,706,178  44.10  1,213,334 
OHS1999  47.88  2,629,823  46.31  1,264,545 
LFS2000a  45.86  2,436,509  45.93  1,258,217 
LFS2000b  40.10  3,000,945  40.15  1,368,944 
LFS2001a  44.47  2,831,238  39.63  1,324,872 
LFS2001b  44.11  2,871,162  43.56  1,353,037 
LFS2002a  42.56  2,898,290  41.69  1,402,830 
LFS2002b  41.98  2,964,317  42.63  1,376,572 
LFS2003a  42.17  2,971,252  40.67  1,429,005 
LFS2003b  40.35  2,993,906  39.26  1,415,316 
LFS2004a  39.49  3,095,936  38.55  1,514,700 
LFS2004b  37.89  3,050,731  39.68  1,492,753 
                                                           
11 Pencavel (2005) reports a decline in private sector union membership in many industrial countries, 
including Britain, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Japan.   16
LFS2005a  40.40  3,162,041  38.07  1,495,135 
LFS2005b  39.33  3,220,504  40.96  1,571,036 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
FIGURE 1: UNION DENSITY FOR BLACK EMPLOYED WORKERS 












































































































































% Male Union %
Female Union %
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
3.2.2.2 Union Density by Race 
The racial composition of unions has remained largely unchanged since 1995
12. Black 
male and female workers comprise the largest part of union members, followed by white, 





                                                           
12 It must be noted however, that incomplete survey questionnaires (particularly in questions pertaining to 
race and earnings) complicate data processing.  
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Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
Table 3 indicates an increase in union density amongst all except black male workers 
between 1995 and 2005.  
 
TABLE 3: UNION DENSITY BY RACE FOR EMPLOYED MALE WORKERS 
 
   Black   Coloured  Indian  White  Total 
OHS1995  38.97  29.14  29.99  28.31  1,854,628 
OHS1996  36.18  33.88  33.56  30.17  1,572,991 
OHS1997  48.10  38.28  37.01  27.32  1,754,048 
OHS1998  46.08  38.93  29.00  24.92  1,687,314 
OHS1999  47.88  35.06  33.48  36.26  1,728,987 
LFS2000a  45.86  32.78  34.64  34.37  1,585,279 
LFS2000b  40.10  31.05  34.08  28.45  1,686,992 
LFS2001a  44.47  33.14  29.54  32.91  1,732,104 
LFS2001b  44.11  32.95  30.42  34.33  1,767,113 
LFS2002a  42.56  32.39  30.63  28.75  1,683,957   18
LFS2002b  41.98  30.95  34.91  28.64  1,684,727 
LFS2003a  42.17  31.70  36.98  30.00  1,711,589 
LFS2003b  40.35  32.9  36.84  30.77  1,667,937 
LFS2004a  39.49  29.46  36.42  27.81  1,656,942 
LFS2004b  37.89  31.50  30.26  29.87  1,566,498 
LFS2005a  40.40  36.73  35.35  27.82  1,717,804 
LFS2005b  39.33  37.04  44.88  35.27  1,811,375 
 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
By 2005, union membership was most prevalent amongst Indian workers and appeared to 
be increasing for all but black male workers. 
 
3.2.2.3 Private and Public Sector Union Density 
Union density is generally in most countries larger in the public than in the private sector 
due  to  the  fact  that  the  public  sector  is  often  characterized  by  a  strong  bureaucratic 
undertone, creating an environment in which workers feel they need a collective voice 
(Blanchflower, 1996). Further, wage negotiations are easier since market forces do not 
“discipline” this sector (Bean and Holden, 1994: 13).   19
TABLE 4: UNION DENSITY BY SECTOR FOR MALE WORKERS (ALL 
RACES) 
   Public  Private 
OHS1995  49.79  32.37 
OHS1996  46.59  31.43 
OHS1997  57.89  38.1 
OHS1998  61.28  36.1 
OHS1999  66.27  36.63 
LFS2000a  66.01  34.28 
LFS2000b  65.19  30.17 
LFS2001a  68.54  33.09 
LFS2001b  69.8  33.42 
LFS2002a  66.01  31.79 
LFS2002b  71.75  30.65 
LFS2003a  66.01  32.08 
LFS2003b  68.88  31.89 
LFS2004a  65.63  30.4 
LFS2004b  63.73  29.15 
LFS2005a  65.96  32.04 
LFS2005b  68.4  32.27 
 
Source: Own calculations for OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-1005 
 
Table 4 indicates that union density in the South African public sector increased between 
1995 and 2005, while union density in the private sector displayed a stable trend. Public 
sector union density peaked in 2002 and is substantially larger than in the private sector . 
The large union density in the public sector may possibly also be explained by closed 
shop  agreements  that  still  apply  in  the  public  sector,  implying  that  workers  may  be 
required by firm regulations to join a union.   20
















































































































































































Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
3.2.2.4 Composition of Unions 
A  longstanding  question  in  the  literature  is  whether  the  union  wage  premium  is 
exclusively  the  result  of  union  bargaining  or  whether  membership  composition  (and 
therefore differences in worker attributes between unionised and nonunionised workers) 
plays a  role in the  gap between the wages  received by  unionised workers and those 
received  by  their  nonunionised  counterparts.  Table  5  compares  the  productive 
characteristics of union and nonunion workers. 
   21
TABLE 5: MEAN CHARACTERISTICS OF UNION AND NONUNION 
WORKERS (ALL RACES) 
 
Union  Education  Experience  Tenure  Age 
OHS1995  9.65  21.42  9.36  37.09 
LFS2000a  9.77  22.46  10.93  38.33 
LFS2000b  10.03  22.76  10.73  38.83 
LFS2005a  10.43  23.32  11.21  39.77 
LFS2005b  10.64  22.68  10.37  39.36 
Nonunion             
OHS1995  8.86  20.73  6.59  35.62 
LFS2000a  9.57  19.35  6.30  35.02 
LFS2000b  9.56  19.86  5.65  35.48 
LFS2005a  10.25  19.15  5.47  35.44 
LFS2005b  10.18  19.12  5.01  35.32 
 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
It is clear that at the mean, the productive characteristics of unionised and nonunionised 
workers differ. Unionised workers appear to have invested more in human capital, 
illustrated by higher mean levels of education and experience amongst union members 
relative to nonunion workers. The difference is more pronounced for experience levels, 
while the difference in education levels between the two groups appears to have 
diminished by 2005. The difference in tenure between the two groups has become more 
pronounced between 1995 and 2005, possibly as a result of bargaining agreements that 
increased job security amongst union members. The average age for union members has 
increased since 1995, indicating the possibility that workers of a particular generation 
remain union members for longer. 
   22
4.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This study aims to track the union premium in South Africa over the period 1995 to 2005. 
The objective of the study is not therefore to add new determinants to the union decision 
and earnings function. The five methods discussed in section 2 are applied to all the 
available  data  sets,  rendering  the  results  obtained  less  sensitive  to  survey-specific 
sampling errors.  
 
4.1 TRENDS IN EARNINGS LEVELS 
4.1.1 General Trends for Black Workers 
Wages of unionised workers appeared to have increased over the 10 year period under 
investigation, while those of nonunionised workers remained fairly stable. This growth in 
union wages was visible from 2002 onwards, as illustrated in figure 6. 
























































Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
The wage differential between unionised and nonunionised workers was evident from 
1997 and increased in subsequent years. The growth in union wages may be explained by 
increasing  union  power  over  the  period  under  consideration,  as  well  as  by  increased 
economic growth since 2002( because increased economic growth may reflect increasing   23
productivity  amongst  workers,  therefore  resulting  in  a  higher  skills  levels  amongst 
unionised workers). This is explored later in section 4.2. 
 
FIGURE 7: MEAN REAL MONTHLY EARNINGS FOR BLACK WORKERS 
(2000 PRICES) 























































Amongst black workers (both male and female), unionised workers earned substantially 
more than their nonunionised counterparts. On average, union wages appeared to increase 
over time, escalating particularly after 2002. Further, female unionised workers appeared 
to  earn  a  higher  average  wage  than  their  male  counterparts.  Despite  similar  union 
densities between male and female workers, female workers appeared to derive greater 
benefits from their status as union members – a finding largely in line  with what theory 
predicts
13.  
Figure 7 also shows that wages of nonunionised workers decreased slightly after 1999, 
but returned to their original level by 2005. Further, male workers in this sector appeared 
to earn slightly more than female workers (in line with traditional discrimination theory 
(Deery and De Cieri, 1991)). Interestingly, while the gender wage gap increased over 
time among union workers, it appeared to decrease over time among nonunion workers.  
                                                           
13 Female workers are considered more “vulnerable” within the setting of the labour market and are 
therefore expected to derive more benefit from wage increases and job security associated with union 
membership.    24
Figure 8 shows a similar trend:  the union wage gap
14 for both male and female black 
workers appeared to diverge over time. The differential increased for both groups of 
workers up until 2004, after which it decreased.  
 
FIGURE 8: MEAN EARNINGS DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN UNION AND 








































Source: Own calculations form OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
In sum, it appears that the wages of unionised workers increased over the period under 
investigation, while those of nonunionised workers remained largely stable. This may 
indicate  that  unions  were  effective  in  securing  wage  increases  for  their  workers, 
particularly from 2002 onwards. This is supported by the results obtained regarding the 
mean earnings differential between unionised and nonunionised workers: the earnings 
differential increased unambiguously for males between 1995 and 2005, while females 
experienced an increased differential in every year except 2002. Although the differential 
for both males and females decreased between 2004 and 2005, the general trend over the 
10 year period indicates that unionised workers received higher wages than those of their 
nonunionised  counterparts  –  a  finding  that  further  suggests  that  unions  were  largely 
effective in securing higher wages for their members 
                                                           
14 Calculated as [(mean monthly union wage)/(mean monthly nonunion wage)]-1, measured in 2000 prices.   25
 
4.1.2 Public and Private Sector Earnings Trends 
Figure  9  below  illustrates  higher  public  sector  earnings  (relative  to  private  sector 
earnings) for the entire period between 1995 and 2005.  
 
FIGURE 9: MEAN REAL MONTHLY EARNINGS (2000 PRICES) FOR MALES 





















































Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
A strong union effect  was evident in the public sector because mean union earnings 
increased from 1997 onwards, reflecting the trend in union density and suggesting an 
association between increased union density and increased union earnings. The union 
influence in the private sector was considerably smaller: mean private sector earnings 
remained stable over the decade under investigation. The divergence between union and 
nonunion earnings in the public sector may be explained by the prevalence of closed shop 
agreements in the largest part of this sector, suggesting that the private sector union 
premium may have been larger than that in the public sector. However, public sector 
earnings were higher than private sector earnings at the mean as a result of closed shop 
agreements.  
Unions may therefore be seen to have been considerably more effective at increasing the 
wages of their members in the public sector than was the case for their members in the 
private sector.    26
The  difference  in  the  earnings  structures  prevalent  in  the  public  and  private  sectors 
suggest that these sectors should be analysed independently of each other. However, data 
constraints rendered the separate analysis of these sectors impossible and so a dummy 
variable for the public sector was included in order to control for differences in the data 
generating processes in the public and private sectors. 
 
4.2 UNION WAGE PREMIUM 
Hildreth (1999: 6) regards the union wage premium as a proxy for union power. Union 
premiums over time may therefore be considered a rough indication of changes in union 
bargaining  power  (Hildreth,  1999:  6).  However,  the  wages  paid  to  workers  are  also 
dependent on the size of the firm, its productivity and other cost related factors (Arbache 
and Carneiro, 1999: 1875). Furthermore, Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that union 
power is associated with the sensitivity of labour demand to wage increases: the less 
sensitive labour demand is, the higher the potential wage gains from union membership. 
Finally,  the  size  of  the  union  premium  is  dependent  on  the  ability  of  the  unions  to 
organize large groups of workers. Larger groups therefore imply larger potential wage 
premiums (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2004: 386). 
An analysis of the union wage premium will provide an indication of the extent of union 
power over the last decade. A decomposition of the results investigates the drivers of 
changes in the premium and whether its trends over time may correctly be ascribed to 
union power. 
 
4.2.1 Functional Form of Earnings Estimation 
The dependent variable (as per Mincerian tradition) is the natural logarithm of the hourly 
wage  rate
15  (Mincer,  1974).  The  earnings  functions  aim  to  capture  the  full  effect  of 
human  capital  advances  on  earnings  by  incorporating  education  level,  human  capital 
investment  and  experience  in  a  specific  functional  form.  Additional  structural  and 
personal variables are also accounted for.   
A logarithmic functional form investigates the relative difference between wages of union 
and nonunion workers, allowing for an alternative analysis in the form of the differences 
in standard deviation of the log of wages between union and nonunion earnings functions. 
                                                           
15 This study uses the logarithm of hourly wages, including bonuses and overtime, excluding tax, which is 
in accordance with earnings literature, since hourly wages control for the disparity in hours worked 
(Hofmeyr and Lucas 2001:697).   27
This  serves  as  a  crude  indication  of  the  dispersion  of  earnings.  A  smaller  standard 
deviation therefore indicates less dispersion (Freeman, 1980: 6). 
 
4.2.2 The Union Wage Premium in South Africa 
The analysis begins with an OLS model of earnings in which standard variables and an 
exogenous union dummy  variable is included to capture the union wage effect. This 
method assumes that worker characteristics are rewarded similarly in the unionised and 
nonunionised  sectors.  Hence,  only  an  intercept  shift  between  union  members  and 
nonunion members applies (Addison and Hirsch, 1986: 124). Next, allowance is made for 
the possibility of endogenous union membership. A selection term derived from a probit 
is included to correct for this possible selction bias. Additional variables are included in 
the probit, namely age and the number of employed members in the household. Finally, a 
standard switching model is used, recognizing the potential difference in the reward of 
attributes  (and  therefore  differences  in  the  coefficients)  between  union  and  nonunion 
workers. 
 
TABLE 6: UNION WAGE PREMIUM 1995 – 2005 





1995  14.03  14.04  24.54 
1996  24.58  24.56  45.77 
1997  9.59  9.08  19.53 
1998  28.13  28.19  36.70 
1999  24.14  23.96  31.84 
2000  25.48  25.39  33.37 
2001  28.78  28.30  44.69 
2002  29.26  29.32  46.90 
2003  26.11  25.75  32.13 
2004  27.77  27.42  34.91 
2005  28.02  27.75  31.09 
Source: Own calculations form OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005   28
 
Table 6 indicates that all three estimation methods result in the same pattern for the union 
premium. The union wage premium estimated using the OLS model and the treatment 
effects  model  are  similar,  but  the  union  wage  premium  estimates  obtained  using  the 
switching model are considerably larger. Indeed, the union wage premium estimated for  
1995  using  OLS  and  the  treatment  effects  is  approximately  14  percent  while  the 
switching model places the union premium at slightly less than 25 percent in the same 
year. Hofmeyr and Lucas (2001) estimate a union premium of 26.5 percent for black 
workers using the SALDRU 1993 dataset while Butcher and Rouse (2000) estimate a 
union  wage  premium  of  20  percent  for  black  workers  using  OHS  1995.  It  appears 
therefore that the OLS and switching methods form boundaries for possible estimates. 
The large decrease in the union wage premium suggests data-related problems in 1997 – 
































































Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
With the exception of the significant decrease in the union premium in 1997, the union 
wage premium increased between 1995 and 2002. The sharp decrease in 1997 was likely 
the result of errors related to the October Household survey of that year, as noted above. 
From 1998 onwards, the union wage premium increased steadily, although OLS estimates   29
fluctuated between 25 and 28 percent after 2000. On average, however, the union wage 
premium estimated using OLS did not change much between 1998 and 2005.  
All three the models see the union wage premium reaching a maximum in 2002, after 
which  estimates  from  OLS  and  the  treatment  effects  technique  remained  stable.  The  
switching  model  estimates  a  decrease  in  the  union  premium  in  2003,  after  which  it 
remained stable. This demonstrates a countercyclical trend when seen in the context of 
accelerated economic growth during the same period. Interesting to note is that the union 
premium broadly follows the trend in union density in the public sector, with density in 
the public sector reaching a maximum in 2002. 
Mean union earnings increased significantly over the period under investigation, despite 
the  fact  that  the  union  premium  remained  stable  after  2002.  The  relevant  question 
remains whether this increase was the product of a change in union composition or a pure 
union effect. Indeed, the substantial decrease (around 14 percent) of the union premium 
estimated  using  the  switching  model  indicates  that  the  gap  between  the  coefficients 
obtained for unionised workers and those obtained for nonunionised workers decreased 
between 2002 and 2003. That is, the productive characteristics of these two groups of 
workers were rewarded somewhat more similarly from 2003 onwards. This may indicate 
that the composition of union workers had some influence on the increase in mean union 
earnings  after  2002.  The  fact  that  unionised  workers  experienced  increased  wages 
coupled with the fact that the difference between the rewarding of characteristics between 
unionised and nonunionised workers became smaller may suggest that some of the more 
productive  nonunionised  workers  given  their  characteristics  may  have  joined  unions 
between 2002 and 2003, therefore changing the composition of the unionised sector and 
ultimately increasing the wage level of unionised workers in the years following 2002. 
This confirms the aforementioned speculation that higher levels of economic growth may 
well have resulted in an increase in the level of skills amongst unionised workers and 
therefore in an increase in union wage levels. 
 
4.2.3 Decomposition 
The  mean  union-nonunion  wage  gap  is  calculated  using  the  switching  model  and  is 
subsequently  decomposed  using  the  method  employed  by  Oaxaca  (1973).  The 
unexplained component of this decomposition can be ascribed to a pure union effect. For 
comparative purposes, the nonunion group is indicated as the reference category since 
this group was used as the base in the switching model (Moll 1993). This indicates that 
nonunion  wages  would  prevail  in  the  absence  of  unions,  rendering  the  wage  gap  an 
indication of the increase in wages that nonunionised workers would receive upon joining 
a union (Neumark, 1988;  Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). 
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FIGURE 12: OAXACA-BLINDER DECOMPOSITION OF MEAN UNION WAGE 























































Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
The results obtained from the Oaxaca decomposition are in line with those reported in the 
previous section. The year 1997 saw a significant decrease in the average wage gap after 
which an increasing trend between union and nonunion workers was observed until 2002. 
The average wage gap remained stable until 2005.  
The unexplained component of the wage gap peaked in 2002, indicating that the wage 
gap  between  union  and  nonunion  workers  was  not  driven  by  differences  in  the 
characteristics of workers.  Despite a decline after 2002, there was an average increase in 
the  unexplained  component  since  1995,  indicating  a  union  effect  that  was  neither 
explained  by  worker  characteristics,  nor  captured  by  our  models.  Interestingly,  the 
explained component of the wage gap increased more during the last decade than the 
unexplained  component,  therefore  supporting  the  possibility  of  an  increasing 
compositional effect discussed above, in which the wage gap was affected by changes in 
unobserved  worker  attributes. This may serve as partial justification  for the  fact that 
unionised workers earn higher wages than their nonunionised counterparts. In an effort to 
identify the main drivers of the wage gap, we decompose the wage gaps for 1995, 2002 
and 2005
16. The detailed decomposition follows the method employed by Yun (2003). 
                                                           
16 The wage gap in 2002 is investigated since for all four preceding methods, the wage premium reached a 
maximum in that year. In addition the unexplained component of the wage gap also reached a maximum in 
that year.   31
 
  TABLE 7: ABSOLUTE VALUE OF UNEXPLAINED COMPONENT OF 
THE WAGE GAP OBTAINED IN THE OAXACA DECOMPOSITION 
   Total  Explained  Unexplained  
1995  0.722  0.464  0.258 
1996  0.656  0.277  0.379 
1997  0.529  0.322  0.207 
1998  0.738  0.386  0.352 
1999  0.693  0.418  0.275 
2000  0.759  0.445  0.314 
2001  0.796  0.431  0.365 
2002  0.872  0.446  0.426 
2003  0.854  0.532  0.322 
2004  0.863  0.553  0.310 
2005  0.882  0.539  0.343 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
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4.2.3.2 Detailed Decomposition 






































































































Source: Own calculations form OHS 1995 
Figure 13 indicates that in 1995 the explained component of the wage gap was largely 
driven  by  differences  in  the  levels  of  educational  attainment  between  unionised  and 
nonunionised workers, as well as by factors specific to the industry and occupation in 
which workers found themselves. The “union advantage” may therefore be justified by 
human  capital  differences,  as  well  as  by  job  specific  differences.  However,  union 
membership  was  negatively  associated  with  experience,  and  the  union  premium  was 
negatively  associated  with  the  level  of  experience  that  a  worker  had.  This  indicates 
possible wage compression among union workers. 
The largest driver of the union wage gap (specifically of the unexplained component) was 
the constant term, implying that the pure union effect (i.e. the increase in wages resulting 
from union wage bargaining) union union influence was the main determinant of the 
union-nonunion wage gap. Therefore in 1995 the premium earned by unionised workers 
relative to their nonunionised counterparts was largely driven by union attachment and 
not worker attributes.    33
 



































































































Source: Own calculations from LFS 2002 
Figure 14 indicates that union attachment had a negative impact on the compensation for 
education,  experience,  tenure,  industry  and  occupation,  indicating  the  possibility  of 
increased wage compression among union workers compared to 1995.  
The constant term in 2002 was larger than the total wage gap – possibly a result of the 
negative rewards accruing to experience. It appears that the union-nonunion wage gap in 
2002 was driven primarily by the pure union effect discussed earlier as illustrated by the 
size  of  the  constant  term  within  the  unexplained  element.  This  result  indicates  the 
substantial power that unions exerted during the wage setting process. 
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Source: Own calculations from LFS 2005 
Although the influence exerted by unions on wages was still evident in 2005, it appeared 
less pronounced, supporting the stabilizing trend noted in the estimated conditional union 
wage premiums. Human capital seemed to have played a more prominent role in the 
explanation of the union-nonunion wage gap than it did in 1995, indicating the increased 
compositional effect in wage determination, even among unionised workers. Further, the 
negative association with the industry and human capital variables had decreased relative 
to 2002, indicating the possibility of a decline in wage compression among unionised 
workers. This may serve as further evidence that the composition of the union sector had 
undergone  transformation,  with  increasingly  skilled  workers  joining  unions  and  the 
rewards for their superior attributes resulting in a lesser degree of compression within the 
union sector.  
Wage differentials are often used as a proxy for union power over time. The increase in 
the union wage premium over the last decade, regardless of its magnitude or method of 
estimation,  indicated  that  unions  in  South  Africa  were  influential.  Although  union 
membership  still  indicated  a  possible  wage  benefit  in  2005,  the  compositional  effect 
within unions seemed to have become an increasingly important factor in explaining the 
union-nonunion wage gap towards the end of the decade, suggesting that the advantage 
that unionised workers had relative to their nonunionised counterparts was increasingly 
based on worker characteristics and not simply on the effectiveness with which unions 
were able to secure additional benefits for their members.    35
 
4.2.4 Quantile Regression 
Quantile regression was used to investigate whether unions play a role in remedying 
inequality in the South African labour market. In order to investigate this, the estimated 
union  premium  was  observed  in  quantile  regressions  run  at  the  20
th,  50
th  and  80
th 
percentiles of the wage distribution.  
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Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
From figure 16, it is clear that the advantage of belonging to a union was greatest for 
workers at the lower end of the wage distribution, becoming smaller as one moved up the 
wage distribution.  This implies that unions may well be geared towards the needs of 
workers at the lower end of wage distribution (and therefore most likely at the lower end 
of the skills distribution). It was more beneficial for “poorer” workers to belong to unions 
than  it  was  for  richer  workers.  Union  membership  may  therefore  be  seen  to  have 
decreased the level of inequality within the union sector since the advantage of belonging 
to a union was greatest for workers at the lower end of the wage distribution.  
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FIGURE 17: GAP BETWEEN 20
TH PERCENTILE UNION PREMIUM AND 80
TH 
















Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
Figure 17 indicates that the difference between the premium received by workers at the 
lower end of the wage distribution and that received by workers at the higher end of the 
wage distribution followed a generally increasing trend from 2002 onwards. There was a 
substantial  increase  in  this  differential  in  1997,  driven  mainly  by  an  increase  in  the 
premium received by workers at the lower end of the distribution (as opposed to an 
increase amongst workers at the upper end of the distribution), after which the differential 
decreased until 2001. From 2002 onwards, the differential increased, peaking in 2003.  
Unions  may  therefore  be  said  to  have  had  an  inequality  reducing  character  over  the 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Collective bargaining structures are traditionally “the outcome of a country’s economic 
and  social  fabric”  (Pencavel,  2005:  76),  while  the  specific  influence  of  unions  is 
contingent  on  the  “economic,  legal  and  structural  environment”  (Hirsch,  2004:  425). 
Value systems differ across countries and hence the response of institutional structures to 
bargaining pressures will vary.  
This is of particular relevance in South Africa, where unions have played an integral role 
in labour markets leading up to democracy in 1994. Since then, the role of trade unions in 
the mediating processes has increased and unions continue to wield considerable political 
influence (Wood, 1998). We may therefore question whether union power (proxied by 
their ability to raise wages for members) ultimately exerts positive or negative influences 
on the South African labour market. Indeed many South African employers ascribe the 
growth in capital-intensive production to restrictive labour legislation and labour related 
problems  owing  to  collective  bargaining,  ultimately  increasing  the  perceived  cost  of 
labour  (Fallon,  1992:  23).  These  changes  have  affected  the  unskilled  most  severely, 
creating considerable scope for concern against the backdrop of huge level of earnings 
inequality in the country. 
This study estimated the union wage premium for the period 1995 to 2005 in an effort to 
discern  a  trend  in  union  power.  A  substantial  increase  in  the  average  union  wage 
premium  was  observed  over  the  period.  Detailed  decompositions  of  the  wage  gap 
demonstrated that the advantage enjoyed by unionised workers was largely driven by the 
power that unions had to  increase the earnings of their members, and not by differences 
in the attributes of unionised and nonunionised workers. However, despite the fact that 
the  union  wage  gap  was  attributed  predominantly  to  union  power,  the  compositional 
effect  had  gained  importance  over  the  last  decade,  indicating  that  the  premium  was 
becoming  increasingly  driven  by  union  interaction  with  differences  in  worker 
characteristics. 
Interestingly, the final section of the empirical  analysis suggested that  South African 
unions had a certain inequality-reducing character about them since the union premium 
enjoyed by poorer workers (or at least workers at the lower end of the wage distribution) 
was larger than their counterparts at the higher end of the wage distribution. Indeed, this 
inequality-reducing characteristic of unions appeared to be increasing. 
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6. APPENDIX 
OLS Estimates (The treatments effect model render quantatively similar results and detailed estimations are therefore excluded) 
Absolute t-values indicated in parentheses, significance at 5% level. 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Education  -0.0551  -0.0397  -0.0230  0.0128  -0.0239  -0.0349  -0.0299  -0.0587  -0.0531  -0.0583  -0.0611 
  (8.39)  (3.31)  (2.48)  (1.06)  (2.29)  (3.46)  (4.06)  (7.30)  (7.68)  (7.24)  (7.11) 
Education2  0.0088  0.0082  0.0063  0.0034  0.0068  0.0074  0.0074  0.0097  0.0095  0.0092  0.0093 
  (17.39)  (9.49)  (9.67)  (3.68)  (8.50)  (10.61)  (13.91)  (16.04)  (18.72)  (16.45)  (15.16) 
Experience  0.0200  0.0228  0.0194  0.0214  0.0239  0.0195  0.0293  0.0312  0.0323  0.0276  0.0228 
  (7.20)  (4.84)  (4.89)  (3.68)  (5.15)  (4.63)  (9.32)  (10.96)  (11.77)  (9.00)  (7.37) 
Experience2  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0003 
  (6.38)  (4.39)  (4.64)  (2.67)  (3.92)  (4.02)  (7.47)  (8.62)  (9.67)  (7.16)  (5.04) 
Tenure  0.0127  0.0134  0.0129  0.0134  0.0140  0.0124  0.0117  0.0136  0.0140  0.0159  0.0132 
  (12.25)  (7.00)  (8.79)  (6.19)  (7.95)  (7.69)   
(10.36) 
(12.37)  (13.37)  (13.66)  (10.40) 
Occ2  0.2846  0.4318  0.3898  0.7475  0.4225  0.5803  0.4033  0.3281  0.3737  0.4949  0.7273 
  (4.40)  (4.95)  (8.00)  (6.05)  (5.07)  (6.50)  (5.79)  (4.03)  (5.46)  (6.60)  (10.60) 
Occ3  0.3715  0.3594  9.3483  0.5068  0.3584  0.3311  0.4372  0.3360  0.4009  0.4438  0.4505 
  (10.22)  (6.32)  (7.33)  (6.70)  (5.31)  (5.76)  (10.38)  (8.58)  (11.78)  (10.61)  (11.49) 
Occ4  0.1390  0.1635  0.0694  0.1968  0.1810  0.1343  0.2560  0.1302  0.2156  0.2276  0.2598 
  (4.33)  (2.87)  (1.48)  (2.59)  (3.45)  (2.77)  (7.07)  (3.77)  (6.02)  (5.67)  (6.27) 
Occ5  0.0612  -0.0693  -0.0432  0.0324  -0.0823  -0.1235  -0.0527  -0.2098  -0.0783  -0.0882  -0.1167 
  (2.13)  (1.48)  (1.22)  (0.59)  (1.84)  (2.71)  (1.72)  (7.10)  (2.42)  (2.85)  (3.55) 
Occ6  0.2904  0.0624  0.0031  0.0456  0.1068  -0.0047  0.1805  0.0895  0.2686  -0.0191  0.0929 
  (2.91)  (0.71)  (0.04)  (0.70)  (1.61)  (0.07)  (2.97)  (1.47)  (3.83)  (0.23)  (0.78) 
Occ7  0.1697  0.0753  0.0973  0.0470  0.0607  0.0022  0.1103  0.0421  0.1321  0.0924  0.0725 
  (6.62)  (1.85)  (3.17)  (1.04)  (1.54)  (0.06)  (4.24)  (1.77)  (5.68)  (3.64)  (2.45) 
Occ8  0.1266  0.1189  0.0597  0.0768  0.0239  0.0373  0.1122  0.0167  0.0883  0.0596  0.0826 
  (6.26)  (3.10)  (2.21)  (1.89)  (0.69)  (1.32)  (4.70)  (0.76)  (4.11)  (2.68)  (3.31) 
Indus2  0.6715  0.8938  0.9066  0.8961  0.7526  0.9357  0.8162  0.8950  0.7286  0.7252  0.6747 
  (22.41)  (14.17)  (18.05)  (15.08)  (15.86)  (23.33)  (24.73)  (29.57)  (24.12)  (23.18)  (16.60) 
Indus3  0.8364  0.8751  0.9457  1.0976  0.9035  0.9235  0.7721  0.8760  0.6777  0.5937  0.5065 
  (31.45)  (14.31)  (19.72)  (18.14)  (18.09)  (21.25)  (22.89)  (28.39)  (21.74)  (17.94)  (13.29) 
Indus4  0.9719  0.8958  1.0284  1.1547  1.1051  1.0661  0.9796  0.8405  0.8339  0.7613  0.5656 
  (15.80)  (7.78)  (13.32)  (9.22)  (9.82)  (4.97)  (15.11)  (11.48)  (11.86)  (10.81)  (7.87) 
Indus5  0.6829  0.6980  0.8987  0.9537  0.7890  0.7782  0.6552  0.7143  0.5313  0.4346  0.3741 
  (19.33)  (10.90)  (16.30)  (13.28)  (12.54)  (14.68)  (16.52)  (20.19)  (15.07)  (11.45)  (8.87)   39
Indus6  0.7279  0.7650  0.8117  0.8946  0.6991  0.7336  0.5796  0.6747  0.4195  0.3597  0.3206 
  (22.34)  (12.38)  (16.26)  (13.59)  (12.79)  (15.59)  (16.82)  (21.04)  (13.27)  (10.86)  (8.47) 
Indus7  0.8318  0.8470  0.8765  1.0059  0.8840  0.8767  0.7254  0.8116  0.6446  0.5482  0.4197 
  (24.38)  (12.48)  (16.03)  (13.12)  (14.14)  (15.71)  (16.67)  (17.90)  (14.58)  (12.05)  (8.54) 
Indus8  0.8554  0.8385  0.8511  0.8928  0.8263  0.7383  0.7226  0.8009  0.5686  0.4718  0.3899 
  (19.65)  (11.43)  (13.64)  (11.98)  (12.19)  (11.92)  (16.81)  (19.24)  (12.57)  (11.51)  (8.56) 
Indus9  0.7750  0.7527  0.6507  0.8484  0.9106  0.8864  0.7609  0.8327  0.6672  0.5346  0.3961 
  (13.62)  (6.54)  (7.19)  (7.83)  (8.59)  (14.19)  (15.35)  (18.82)  (13.19)  (13.10)  (8.11) 
Indus10  0.2568  0.3665  0.5775  0.1940  0.1285  0.2362  0.0066  -0.2755  0.0237  0.0811  -0.0608 
  (4.26)  (3.31)  (4.33)  (1.17)  (0.95)  (1.66)  (0.05)  (2.45)  (0.16)  (1.05)  (0.70) 
Public  0.1694  0.2523  0.4226  0.2864  0.1075  0.2142  0.2401  0.2376  0.2725  0.3178  0.3371 
  (3.04)  (2.33)  (5.07)  (2.83)  (1.07)  (4.60)  (5.70)  (6.31)  (6.06)  (9.19)  (8.79) 
Rural  -0.1163  -0.2202  -0.2158  -0.2877  -0.1771  -0.2241  -0.2322  -0.2015  -0.1891  -0.2309  -0.2242 
  (7.32)  (7.36)  (9.99)  (8.99)  (6.07)  (8.19)  (13.40)  (12.20)  (10.95)  (12.60)  (11.74) 
Head  0.0903  0.0863  0.0859  0.0136  0.0711  0.0947  0.0836  0.0799  0.0991  0.0943  0.0425 
  (4.61)  (2.60)  (3.19)  (0.29)  (1.86)  (3.12)  (3.40)  (3.69)  (4.51)  (3.96)  (1.78) 
Married  0.0533  0.0993  0.0209  0.0433  0.0710  0.0827  0.0512  0.0392  0.0540  0.0249  0.0639 
  (2.78)  (3.01)  (0.80)  (1.01)  (2.33)  (3.13)  (2.51)  (2.02)  (2.90)  (1.22)  (3.00) 
Children  -0.0040  -0.0143  0.0028  -0.0039  -0.0134  -0.0071  -0.0138  -0.0223  -0.0167  -0.0124  -0.0198 
  (0.92)  (1.74)  (0.50)  (0.45)  (1.78)  (1.02)  (2.55)  (4.35)  (3.08)  (2.06)  (3.03) 
Union  0.1313  0.2197  0.0916  0.2479  0.2163  0.2270  0.2529  0.2566  0.2320  0.2451  0.2470 
  (8.40)  (7.89)  (4.36)  (7.54)  (7.84)  (9.47)  (13.12)  (14.26)  (12.10)  (12.51)  (11.15) 
_cons  0.6473  0.3757  0.4440  0.1968  0.2054  0.2629  0.1424  0.1236  0.1946  0.4717  0.6319 
  (14.78)  (4.69)  (6.58)  (2.20)  (2.61)  (3.41)  (2.76)  (2.56)  (4.18)  (9.41)  (12.32) 
Observations  9456.0000  4178.0000  6818.0000  4046.0000  6363.0000  9001.0000  13495.0000  13111.0000  12336.0000  12251.0000  12266.0000 
Rsquared  0.5500  0.4558  0.3694  0.4372  0.3997  0.4603  0.4947  0.5557  0.5445  0.5310  0.4708 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
Output For Union Sector Workers 
Absolute t-values indicated in parentheses, significance at 5% level. 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Education  -0.0504  -0.07247  -0.03231  0.012701  -0.01951  -0.06283  -0.04441  -0.06983  -0.0612  -0.05359  -0.06463 
  (4.5)  (3.87)  (2.4)  (0.69)  (1.45)  (3.67)  (4.59)  (8.18)  (6.47)  (4.13)  (5.44) 
Education2  0.008147  0.008749  0.006105  0.002905  0.006103  0.008856  0.007302  0.009651  0.010243  0.008118  0.00991 
  (10.36)  (6.83)  (6.66)  (2.03)  (5.84)  (8.1)  (10.1)  (14.88)  (14.42)  (10.26)  (13.19) 
Experience  0.010751  0.021708  0.008891  0.020333  0.023945  0.021427  0.016892  0.023936  0.035381  0.012329  0.029824 
  (2.5)  (2.93) 
 
(1.51)  (2.14)  (3.45)  (3.26)  (3.16)  (5.45)  (8.43)  (2.44)  (5.79)   40
Experience2  -0.00011  -0.00034  -0.00015  -0.00026  -0.00033  -0.00034  -0.00024  -0.00031  -0.00043  -0.00012  -0.00033 
  (1.54)  (2.71)  (1.53)  (1.55)  (2.94)  (3.21)  (2.78)  (4.42)  (6.19)  (1.37)  (3.87) 
Tenure  0.009978  0.013046  0.013268  0.015138  0.012672  0.011629  0.008439  0.009505  0.009756  0.013574  0.007639 
  (6.29)  (4.74)  (6.73)  (4.45)  (5.48)  (5.04)  (5.73)  (6.78)  (7.08)  (8.24)  (4.31) 
occ2  0.282886  0.462095  0.444497  0.79626  0.421065  0.173026  0.244123  0.17523  0.249675  0.34258  0.434356 
  (3.27)  (4.34)  (7.48)  (4.64)  (4.12)  (1.64)  (3.65)  (2.29)  (3.25)  (4.41)  (5.4) 
occ3  0.41397  0.348783  0.282392  0.577306  0.335368  0.297489  0.403044  0.265026  0.350587  0.356289  0.395607 
  (9.23)  (4.72)  (4.73)  (5.96)  (4.21)  (3.84)  (7.39)  (5.73)  (7.84)  (6.18)  (8.04) 
occ4  0.120236  0.03207  0.070262  0.22167  0.094853  0.15894  0.200945  0.101533  0.218794  0.192449  0.222105 
  (2.85)  (0.38)  (1.1)  (2.38)  (1.41)  (2.4)  (4.27)  (2.25)  (4.64)  (4.06)  (4.08) 
occ5  0.11934  -0.0694  -0.00298  0.216636  -0.03003  -0.02636  -0.03008  -0.16358  0.061221  -0.06408  -0.04787 
  (3.13)  (0.96)  (0.06)  (2.49)  (0.47)  (0.39)  (0.67)  (4)  (1.19)  (1.47)  (0.93) 
occ6  -0.09669  -0.03238  -0.1207  0.060343  0.016909  -0.03882  -0.1302  -0.05388  0.368825  0.015875  0.209476 
  (0.41)  (0.25)  (1.1)  (0.41)  (0.14)  (0.39)  (1.67)  (0.64)  (2.41)  (0.14)  (1.14) 
occ7  0.195004  0.070644  0.086311  0.115991  0.107747  0.025958  0.06956  0.042903  0.216541  0.059208  0.011509 
  (5.29)  (1.28)  (2.02)  (1.67)  (1.93)  (0.57)  (1.8)  (1.3)  (6.07)  (1.49)  (0.22) 
occ8  0.121328  0.090161  0.059885  0.074776  0.022668  0.086734  0.097679  -0.01859  0.125254  -0.01734  0.040799 
  (4.19)  (1.59)  (1.61)  (1.23)  (0.46)  (1.99)  (2.68)  (0.63)  (3.77)  (0.5)  (1) 
indus2  0.449493  0.187601  0.482353  0.649874  0.515001  0.628809  0.550738  0.531528  0.605793  0.699587  0.617531 
  (9.64)  (1.22)  (4.08)  (6.23)  (6.93)  (7.84)  (8.29)  (8.44)  (8.85)  (7.27)  (4.93) 
indus3  0.663911  0.246118  0.564912  0.911542  0.7148  0.67385  0.539456  0.51797  0.621196  0.610163  0.4637 
  (14.33)  (1.6)  (4.8)  (8.63)  (8.39)  (8)  (7.93)  (7.86)  (8.61)  (6.05)  (3.65) 
indus4  0.784599  0.312713  0.626806  1.039471  0.845906  1.065555  0.827582  0.487381  0.819337  0.719155  0.720702 
  (7.14)  (1.27)  (4.29)  (5.62)  (6.83)  (7.34)  (8.8)  (4.64)  (8.31)  (6)  (5.06) 
indus5  0.465375  0.024763  0.501145  0.841857  0.464091  0.625169  0.517823  0.44145  0.479846  0.422915  0.253745 
  (6.28)  (0.14)  (3.68)  (6.66)  (3.65)  (5.7)  (6.17)  (5.84)  (5.91)  (3.9)  (1.63) 
indus6  0.530894  0.141636  0.4671  0.691405  0.576597  0.458416  0.362514  0.311473  0.356098  0.303941  0.166362 
  (9.71)  (0.86)  (3.85)  (5.69)  (5.74)  (4.96)  (4.87)  (4.34)  (4.72)  (3)  (1.27) 
indus7  0.689073  0.275545  0.539896  0.821215  0.887402  0.720112  0.687579  0.640743  0.723878  0.752524  0.464747 
  (13.27)  (1.73)  (4.4)  (5.87)  (9.31)  (7.37)  (9.17)  (8.52)  (8.3)  (7.25)  (3.49) 
indus8  0.639088  0.022512  0.526644  0.606706  0.506393  0.27066  0.388572  0.327134  0.297942  0.259997  0.161779 
  (9.8)  (0.13)  (3.81)  (4.51)  (5.24)  (2.42)  (4.42)  (4.11)  (2.74)  (2.38)  (1.22) 
indus9  0.697295  0.562183  0.44953  0.644682  0.465467  0.681835  0.667956  0.546119  0.6225  0.644802  0.326884 
  (7.53)  (2.96)  (2.71)  (4.4)  (3.41)  (6.69)  (7.38)  (6.68)  (7.29)  (6)  (2.49) 
indus10  0.301592  -0.49941  0.434542  0  -0.35776  0.093745  0.625664  0.002045  -0.29713  0  0.137486 
  (0.81)  (1.39)  (2.36)  0  (1.25)  (0.3)  (6.72)  (0.02)  (4.05)  (0)  (0.7)   41
Public  0.022246  -0.22199  0.214508  0.23425  0.354307  0.195006  0.134286  0.218686  0.252231  0.229007  0.299341 
  (0.26)  (1.15)  (1.62)  (1.71)  (3.03)  (3.09)  (2.04)  (4.06)  (4.98)  (4.12)  (5.21) 
Rural  -0.09249  -0.1665  -0.14796  -0.20842  -0.08063  -0.14757  -0.1524  -0.10569  -0.07794  -0.14888  -0.11485 
  (4.25)  (3.98)  (5.13)  (4.76)  (2.17)  (4.39)  (7.67)  (5.25)  (3.58)  (5.5)  (4.23) 
Head  0.0713  0.026937  0.116894  0.070811  0.017069  0.138119  0.149444  0.071166  0.080996  0.076988  0.019176 
  (2.66)  (0.54)  (3.05)  (0.91)  (0.27)  (2.67)  (3.86)  (2.12)  (2.26)  (2.14)  (0.47) 
Married  0.069179  0.079236  -0.00938  0.030251  0.009042  0.016498  0.01046  0.022894  0.014435  0.039601  0.039909 
  (2.54)  (1.62)  (0.26)  (0.46)  (0.23)  (0.44)  (0.36)  (0.81)  (0.56)  (1.31)  (1.18) 
Children  0.0056034  -0.00891  -0.00908  0.014724  -0.01824  -1.9E-05  -0.00677  -0.00735  -0.01285  0.001452  -0.01462 
  (0.87)  (0.72)  (1.15)  (1.11)  (1.93)  0  (0.97)  (1.12)  (1.57)  (0.18)  (1.32) 
_cons  1.083947  1.550172  1.145109  0.574896  0.728378  0.814858  0.940409  0.94778  0.438492  1.023123  0.911205 
  (14.99)  (8.59)  (8.03)  (3.58)  (5.64)  (6.21)  (9.58)  (10.96)  (4.74)  (8.75)  (6.58) 
Observations  3377  1583  3281  1891  3127  3898  6134  5719  5375  4912  4856 
Rsquared  0.4071  0.2688  0.2427  0.2361  0.2979  0.3475  0.3727  0.4235  0.4689  0.4414  0.4069 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
Output for Nonunion Sector Workers 
Absolute t-values indicated in parentheses, significance at 5% level. 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Education  -0.0578  -0.0373  -0.02052  0.005762  -0.03426  -0.02316  -0.02054  -0.05653  -0.05043  -0.06285  -0.0635 
  (7.03)  (2.47)  (1.61)  (0.37)  (2.22)  (1.82)  (1.96)  (4.75)  (5.29)  (6)  (5.28) 
Education2  0.009221  0.008865  0.006627  0.004287  0.007712  0.00676  0.007407  0.00992  0.00909  0.009981  0.009243 
  (13.55)  (7.88)  (7.23)  (3.51)  (6.58)  (7.41)  (9.79)  (10.83)  (12.93)  (13.1)  (10.17) 
Experience  0.024148  0.024593  0.026412  0.023831  0.024412  0.021474  0.037685  0.037291  0.03176  0.035962  0.020032 
  (6.72)  (4.12)  (4.98)  (3.23)  (3.92)  (4.08)  (9.83)  (9.99)  (8.98)  (9.28)  (5.06) 
Experience2  -0.00038  -0.00038  -0.00043  -0.0003  -0.00031  -0.00029  -0.00051  -0.00053  -0.00048  -0.00051  -0.00026 
  (6.42)  (3.89)  (4.85)  (2.48)  (2.87)  (3.43)  (7.86)  (8.14)  (7.98)  (8.02)  (3.67) 
Tenure  0.01419  0.012753  0.01374  0.012011  0.015929  0.012885  0.015375  0.017419  0.01726  0.01807  0.018346 
  (10.41)  (5.06)  (6.33)  (4.24)  (5.91)  (5.89)  (9.44)  (10.74)  (10.96)  (11.03)  (9.55) 
occ2  0.268363  0.383992  0.323622  0.736374  0.484604  0.897574  0.672082  0.651311  0.60078  0.783706  1.004242 
  (2.94)  (3.15)  (3.65)  (4.06)  (3.28)  (7.51)  (5.1)  (4.07)  (4.63)  (6.32)  (9.24) 
occ3  0.330819  0.386095  0.436041  0.525658  0.373378  0.359876  0.463963  0.422411  0.51262  0.518536  0.463921 
  (5.57)  (4.67)  (5.82)  (3.85)  (3.12)  (4.57)  (7.56)  (6.42)  (9.55)  (8.75)  (7.26) 
occ4  0.159172  0.277008  0.056564  0.178858  0.285496  0.128902  0.286729  0.132504  0.22142  0.22427  0.262266 
  (3.31)  (3.84)  (0.83)  (1.5)  (3.61)  (1.78)  (5.19)  (2.71)  (4.19)  (3.6)  (4.21) 
occ5  0.012908  -0.03914  -0.06648  -0.10332  -0.13185  -0.17834  -0.07286  -0.24861  -0.14933  -0.1045  -0.15725   42
  (0.31)  (0.66)  (1.36)  (1.46)  (2.12)  (2.83)  (1.79)  (6.23)  (3.6)  (2.52)  (3.75) 
occ6  0.336487  0.084638  0.073724  0.04295  0.119988  -0.01476  0.276309  0.12784  0.23569  -0.01946  0.046366 
  (3.12)  (0.84)  (0.82)  (0.6)  (1.58)  (0.17)  (3.41)  (1.67)  (3.14)  (0.21)  (0.32) 
occ7  0.137126  0.086712  0.094977  -0.00433  -0.00357  -0.00054  0.140082  0.01606  0.08324  0.094652  0.096047 
  (3.87)  (1.54)  (2.18)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (3.87)  (0.49)  (2.73)  (2.9)  (2.76) 
occ8  0.136637  0.147692  0.063339  0.092655  0.031255  0.002047  0.109123  0.032678  0.0745  0.103643  0.09099 
  (4.93)  (2.87)  (1.6)  (1.71)  (0.63)  (0.05)  (3.39)  (1.05)  (2.63)  (3.58)  (2.88) 
indus2  0.794817  0.951174  0.998248  0.979069  0.836921  1.018656  0.844268  0.903998  0.77557  0.721356  0.667105 
  (17.21)  (9.62)  (14.47)  (11.87)  (10.59)  (17.97)  (16.12)  (18.35)  (14.97)  (15.21)  (11.32) 
indus3  0.827574  0.842804  0.971097  1.051671  0.91191  0.931487  0.75039  0.865448  0.63814  0.529407  0.458061 
  (23.78)  (10.91)  (16.88)  (12.75)  (13.97)  (17.57)  (17.1)  (22.51)  (16.19)  (14.17)  (11.36) 
indus4  0.978411  0.824504  1.074629  0.986922  1.119407  0.752375  0.886982  0.819825  0.70539  0.803405  0.32467 
  (13.9)  (6.85)  (10.38)  (5.66)  (5.4)  (1.97)  (8.81)  (7.06)  (6.27)  (7.46)  (3.12) 
indus5  0.715783  0.702421  0.92012  0.912085  0.877505  0.75229  0.612228  0.693242  0.50877  0.407486  0.356233 
  (17.11)  (9.4)  (14.28)  (10.38)  (11.73)  (11.76)  (12.77)  (16.25)  (12.08)  (9.29)  (8.2) 
indus6  0.749031  0.746952  0.806346  0.879639  0.688183  0.7474  0.548393  0.66522  0.39568  0.329163  0.333765 
  (17.52)  (10.29)  (13.71)  (10.77)  (10.22)  (12.73)  (13)  (17.05)  (10.07)  (8.46)  (8.45) 
indus7  0.784021  0.767953  0.845179  0.963262  0.71944  0.827674  0.582733  0.688544  0.53422  0.371462  0.325896 
  (15.99)  (8.71)  (11.7)  (10.55)  (8.41)  (11.45)  (10.04)  (11.37)  (9.63)  (6.33)  (5.5) 
indus8  0.874746  0.85883  0.830134  0.892948  0.916715  0.804953  0.71641  0.806406  0.595  0.475306  0.40912 
  (15.22)  (9.53)  (11.08)  (9.49)  (10.17)  (10.51)  (13.56)  (15.73)  (11.95)  (10.01)  (8.12) 
indus9  0.740271  0.649769  0.606634  0.85289  1.06555  0.87106  0.677679  0.771708  0.61114  0.418319  0.359845 
  (10.39)  (4.8)  (5.42)  (5.75)  (7.35)  (11.22)  (11.04)  (12.87)  (8.96)  (8.95)  (6.23) 
indus10  0.26184  0.38649  0.515946  0.254618  0.19882  0.251059  -0.08318  -0.27121  0.00428  0.053317  -0.06583 
  (4.25)  (3.22)  (3.11)  (1.49)  (1.3)  (1.6)  (0.61)  (2.22)  (0.03)  (0.7)  (0.72) 
Public  0.247891  0.356516  0.532778  0.310319  0.031532  0.216822  0.311082  0.258171  0.29074  0.37439  0.412625 
  (3.44)  (2.85)  (5.05)  (2.18)  (0.22)  (3.46)  (5.54)  (4.35)  (4.43)  (8.03)  (7.98) 
Rural  -0.13508  -0.23816  -0.27966  -0.36072  -0.26523  -0.2679  -0.28337  -0.28039  -0.27721  -0.28129  -0.29338 
  (6)  (5.84)  (8.66)  (7.7)  (5.85)  (6.81)  (10.23)  (10.91)  (10.73)  (11.35)  (11.54) 
Head  0.106022  0.121835  0.055685  -0.02162  0.085672  0.064092  0.041322  0.069412  0.10067  0.0831  0.04977 
  (3.85)  (2.78)  (1.47)  (0.37)  (1.77)  (1.74)  (1.36)  (2.56)  (3.64)  (2.79)  (1.7) 
Married  0.046084  0.103989  0.054791  0.046239  0.111487  0.113814  0.070423  0.038924  0.07091  0.009492  0.075198 
  (1.78)  (2.4)  (1.45)  (0.83)  (2.45)  (3.28)  (2.56)  (1.52)  (2.84)  (0.37)  (2.79) 
Children  -0.00875  -0.01667  0.009985  -0.0168  -0.00872  -0.00892  -0.01972  -0.02811  -0.01687  -0.01819  -0.02419 
  (1.5)  (1.56)  (1.29)  (1.47)  (0.77)  (0.95)  (2.58)  (3.91)  (2.44)  (2.19)  (3.04) 
_cons  0.595343  0.27551  0.313518  0.27783  0.181079  0.217846  0.00373  0.066129  0.28063  0.411811  0.702589   43
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
 
Quantile Regression Results 


















































Education  -0.015  -0.038  -0.058    0.005  -0.005  0.025    -0.065  -0.032  -0.012    -0.034  -0.051  0.09 
  (-1.02)  (-3.92)  (-5.94)    (0.18)  (-0.24)  (1.35)    (-3.39)  (-2.52)  (-0.98)    (-1.67)  (-2.68)  (-3.36) 
Education
2  0.006  0.007  0.008    0.006  0.007  0.004    0.01  0.007  0.006    0.006  0.007  0.01 
  (5.95)  (10.11)  (10.51)    (3.33)  (4.87)  (3.02)    (8.25)  (9.14)  (7.24)    (4.47)  (5.71)  (5.95) 
Experienc
e  0.019  0.014  0.015    0.021  0.01  0.001    0.001  0.01  0.007    0.025  0.015  0.013 
  (3.15)  (3.83)  (3.71)    (2.19)  (1.29)  (0.17)    (-0.22)  (2.19)  (1.36)    (3.2)  (2)  (1.36) 
Experienc
e2 (x10
2)  -0.033  -0.019  -0.022    -0.029  -0.013  0.006    0.013  -0.014  -0.008    -0.041  -0.021  -0.013 
  (-3.1)  (-2.83)  (-3.1)    (-1.61)  (-0.91)  (0.44)    (1.05)  (-1.54)  (-0.83)    (-3.02)  (-1.54)  (-0.77) 
Tenure  0.013  0.012  0.011    0.018  0.014  0.016    0.014  0.012  0.011    0.016  0.012  0.013 
  (4.98)  (7.67)  (7.18)    (3.99)  (4.07)  (4.94)    (4.43)  (6.14)  (5.52)    (4.33)  (3.78)  (3.42) 
occ2  -0.004  -0.103  -0.102    0.526  0.121  0.276    0.383  0.129  0.062    0.289  0.388  0.292 
  (-0.02)  (-0.84)  (-0.71)    (2.45)  (0.73)  (1.73)    (3.15)  (1.51)  (0.73)    (1.86)  (2.5)  (1.5) 
occ3  0.086  0.012  -0.097    0.404  0.047  0.214    0.206  -0.007  -0.09    0.174  0.263  0.282 
  (0.52)  (0.11)  (-0.75)    (2.15)  (0.32)  (1.54)    (1.71)  (-0.08)  (-1.06)    (1.27)  (1.9)  (1.66) 
occ4  -0.209  -0.258  -0.376    0.276  -0.123  -0.072    0.213  -0.07  -0.144    -0.11  -0.064  0.003 
  (-1.25)  (-2.31)  (-2.85)    (1.42)  (-0.83)  (-0.52)    (1.82)  (-0.85)  (-1.74)    (-0.8)  (-0.46)  (0.02) 
occ5  -0.47  -0.486  -0.56    -0.074  -0.256  -0.163    -0.026  -0.308  -0.361    -0.202  -0.166  -0.265 
  (-2.8)  (-4.34)  (-4.25)    (-0.37)  (-1.71)  (-1.19)    (-0.22)  (-3.62)  (-4.27)    (-1.48)  (-1.2)  (-1.55) 
occ6  -0.4  -1.008  -0.829    0.124  -0.092  -0.026    -0.189  -0.615  -0.586    -0.25  -0.221  0.744 
  (-1.43)  (-4.66)  (-3.73)    (0.47)  (-0.44)  (-0.13)    (-1.14)  (-5.43)  (-5.13)    (-1.13)  (-1.04)  (2.87) 
occ7  -0.659  -0.602  -0.645    -0.138  -0.258  -0.283    -0.117  -0.387  -0.351    -0.207  -0.339  -0.409 
  (-3.53)  (-4.82)  (-4.43)    (-0.67)  (-1.61)  (-1.93)    (-0.95)  (-4.31)  (-3.95)    (-1.34)  (-2.14)  (-2.02) 
occ8  -0.562  -0.547  -0.625    -0.085  -0.341  -0.122    0.126  -0.249  -0.382    -0.173  -0.102  -0.371 
  (-3.1)  (-4.53)  (-4.43)    (-0.37)  (-1.89)  (-0.71)    (0.92)  (-2.56)  (-3.81)    (-1.04)  (-0.61)  (-1.8) 
occ9  -0.521  -0.622  -0.703    -0.019  -0.337  -0.375    -0.066  -0.375  -0.471    -0.336  -0.269  -0.349 
  (-3.06)  (-5.55)  (-5.34)    (-0.1)  (-2.28)  (-2.8)    (-0.56)  (-4.5)  (-5.72)    (-2.46)  (-1.96)  (-2.07) 
  (10.56)  (2.79)  (3.54)  (2.41)  (1.7)  (2.22)  (0.06)  (1.03)  (4.53)  (6.38)  (11.21) 
Observations  6079  2595  3537  2155  3236  5103  7361  7392  6961  7339  7410 
Rsquared  0.5269  0.4539  0.3988  0.4505  0.3884  0.4333  0.4439  0.5061  0.4733  0.453  0.3953   44
indus2  0.503  0.48  0.455    0.907  0.849  0.605    0.673  0.83  0.506    0.774  0.693  0.291 
  (2.57)  (4.38)  (3.81)    (3.21)  (3.62)  (2.35)    (3.93)  (6.31)  (3.68)    (2.31)  (2.62)  (1.03) 
indus3  0.792  0.638  0.501    0.63  0.398  0.423    0.656  0.706  0.42    0.269  0.759  0.646 
  (11.1)  (13.64)  (10.18)    (5.11)  (3.79)  (4.19)    (7.26) 
(11.73
)  (6.29)    (2.75)  (7.74)  (5) 
indus4  0.777  0.936  0.456    0.891  0.828  0.709    0.442  0.719  0.489 
indus
4  0.852  1.744  1.384 
  (2.84)  (5.86)  (2.82)    (2.45)  (2.91)  (4.55)    (1.43)  (4.08)  (2.83)    (3.62)  (7.52)  (4.54) 
indus5  0.922  0.807  0.852    0.303  0.203  0.579    0.441  0.577  0.613 
indus
5  1.227  1.228  1.868 
  (5.14)  (6.41)  (7.16)    (1.18)  (1.01)  (3.45)    (2.7)  (4.86)  (4.79)    (5.91)  (5.31)  (7.91) 
indus6  0.696  0.534  0.401    0.346  0.279  0.243    0.557  0.598  0.258 
indus
6  0.443  0.732  0.663 
  (10.71)  (13.21)  (9.44)    (2.77)  (2.73)  (2.6)    (6.23)  (9.9)  (3.86)    (4.59)  (7.96)  (5.61) 
indus7  1.194  0.836  0.647    0.855  0.704  0.7    0.616  0.926  0.717 
indus
7  0.909  1.243  0.887 
  9.21  9.12  7.56    (3.26)  (3.64)  (4.32)    (4.4)  (9.37)  (6.72)    (5.19)  (7.53)  (4.29) 
indus8  (0.996)  (0.752)  (0.692)    0.813  0.628  0.563    0.72  0.804  0.454 
indus
8  0.9  1.049  0.809 
  10.16  11.61  10.53    (5.45)  (5.18)  (4.94)    (6.35) 
(10.43
)  (5.42)    (7.62)  (8.98)  (5.58) 
indus9  (0.778)  (0.594)  (0.453)    0.319  0.489  0.361    0.375  0.478  0.34 
indus
9  0.404  0.727  0.73 
  7.19  8.36  6.85    (2.34)  (4.14)  (3.31)    (3.15)  (5.94)  (3.85)    (3.27)  (6.37)  (5.32) 
indus10  (0.051)  (0.065)  (0.2)    -0.284  0.056  0.181    -0.178  0.063  -0.224 
indus
10  0.023  0.309  1.11 
  0.46  0.89  2.65    (-1.41)  (0.34)  (1.15)    (-1.06)  (0.54)  (-2.1)    (0.08)  (1.01)  (3.73) 
Public  (0.145)  (0.117)  (0.13)    0.507  0.27  0.22    0.44  0.363  0.189 
Publi
c  0.422  0.32  0.047 
  1.43  1.75  2.08    (4.61)  (2.89)  (2.32)    (4.44)  (5.5)  (2.67)    (3.86)  (3.44)  (0.43) 
Rural  (-0.173)  (-0.166)  (-0.079)    -0.411  -0.316  -0.271    -0.292  -0.213  -0.191  Rural  -0.288  -0.264  -0.279 
  -5.13  -7.87  -3.64    (-6.94)  (-6.84)  (-6.11)    (-7.26)  (-7.89)  (-6.62)    (-6.22)  (-5.88)  (-4.81) 
Head  (0.112)  (0.094)  (0.116)    0.035  0.055  0.005    0.029  0.049  0.021  Head  -0.013  0.029  0.051 
  2.96  3.97  4.64    (0.54)  (1.13)  (0.11)    (0.69)  (1.68)  (0.7)    (-0.27)  (0.62)  (0.86) 
Married  (0.095)  (0.012)  (0.019)    0.06  0.077  0.066    0.002  -0.03  -0.042 
Marri
ed  -0.046  -0.007  0.087 
  2.85  0.56  0.83    (1.03)  (1.74)  (1.58)    (0.06)  (-1.15)  (-1.52)    (-0.94)  (-0.15)  (1.64) 
Children  (-0.029)  (-0.023)  (-0.005)    0.011  0  -0.007    -0.023  -0.015  -0.011 
Childr
en  -0.043  -0.005  0.015 
  -3.15  -3.94  -0.93    (0.68)  (-0.02)  (-0.62)    (-2.46)  (-2.2)  (-1.58)    (-3.76)  (-0.45)  (0.98) 
Union 
(0.144)  (0.183)  (0.079) 
 
0.233  0.229  0.149 
 
0.319  0.222  0.123 
Unio
n  0.434  0.275  0.249 
  4.38  6.26  3.48    (3.91)  (5.11)  (3.55)    (8.58)  (8.51)  (4.43)    (9.07)  (6.2)  (4.41) 
_cons  (0.459)  (1.385)  (2.096)    -0.348  0.858  0.473    0.203  0.88  1.746  _cons  0.169  0.628  1.428   45
  2.31  10.68  13.82    (-1.13)  (4.19)  (7.7)    (1.23)  (7.48)  (14.66)    (0.87)  (3.23)  (5.77) 
Observati
ons 
4584  4584  4584 
 
1892  1892  1892 
 
3170  3170  3170  Obser
vatio
ns 
1982  1982  1982 
Rsquared 
0.3862  0.3625  0.3326 
 
0.3428  0.3514  0.3277 
 
0.3406  0.3267  0.2697  Rsqu
ared 
0.3396  0.3268  0.2660 





























Education  -0.017  -0.014  -0.016   
-0.017  0.022  0.018    -0.052  -0.038  -0.032 
  (-1.09)  (-1.14)  (-1.05)   
(-1.13)  (2.53)  (1.26)    (-3.18)  (-3.13)  (-2.06) 
Education2  0.007  0.006  0.006   
0.006  0.003  0.003    0.008  0.007  0.007 
  (6061)  (8.26)  (6.31)   
(5.55)  (5.93)  (3.32)    (7.08)  (8.28)  (5.89) 
Experience  0.018  0.013  0.014   
0.019  0.003  -0.002    0.019  0.012  0.001 
  (3.21)  (3.06)  (2.78)   
(3.4)  (0.97)  (-0.38)    (3.64)  (3.23)  (0.3) 
Experience2 
(x10
2)  -0.03  -0.02  -0.019    -0.026  0.006  0.021    -0.037  -0.016  0.007 
  (-2.97)  (-2.57)  (-2.06)   
(-2.58)  (1.16)  (2.24)    (-3.77)  (*2.32)  (0.95) 
Tenure  0.009  0.012  0.007   
0.014  0.014  0.012    0.016  0.014  0.011 
  (3.39)  (60.9)  (2.77)   
(5.28)  (10.82)  (5.02)    (6.56)  (8.41)  (6.56) 
occ2  -0.077  -0.303  -0.125   
0.166  -0.122  -0.551    -0.272  -0.499  -0.699 
  (-0.48)  (-2.58)  (-0.82)   
(1.02)  (-1.56)  (-3.73)    (-1.99)  (-4.37)  (-6.66) 
occ3  -0.032  -0.259  -0.112   
0.068  -0.26  -0.573    -0.222  -0.413  -0.599 
  (-0.21)  (-2.37)  (-0.8)   
(0.48)  (-3.74)  (*4.19)    (-1.78)  (-3.96)  (-6.39) 
occ4  -0.236  -0.34  -0.345   
-0.14  -0.539  *0.853    -0.373  -0.608  -0.771 
  (-1.55)  (-3.12)  (-2.5)   
(-0.97)  (-7.6)  (*6.18)    (-3)  (-5.79)  (-8.18) 
occ5  -0.545  -0.648  -0.534   
-0.616  -0.889  -1.133    -0.765  -0.976  -1.048 
  (-3.52)  (-5.9)  (-3.87)   
(-4.17)  (-12.31)  (-7.94)    (-5.97)  (-9.08)  (-9.93) 
occ6  -0.232  -0.574  -0.623   
-0.34  -0.841  -1.276    -1.008  -1.099  -0.902 
  (-1.19)  (-4.11)  (-3.62)   
(-1.98)  (-8.78)  (-6.92)    (-4.29)  (-6.67)  (-5.63) 
occ7  -0.46  -0.554  -0.605   
-0.6  -0.998  -1.286    -0.72  -0.894  -1.132 
  (-2.81)  (-4.67)  (-4.07)   
(-3.87)  (-12.88)  (-8.7)    (-5.22)  (-7.91)  (-10.45) 
occ8  -0.282  -0.571  -0.469   
-0.502  -0.888  -1.158    -0.673  -0.925  -1.162 
  (-1.67)  (-4.67)  (-2.99)   
(-2.31)  (-11.41)  (-7.61)    (-4.89)  (-8.11)  (-10.68) 
occ9  -0.408  -0.669  -0.613   
-0.531  -0.948  -1.351    -0.693  -0.945  -1.104 
  (-2.67)  (-6.14)  (-4.45)   
(-3.65)  (-13.35)  (-9.58)    (-5.46)  (-8.88)  (-10.86) 
indus2  0.428  0.561  0.662   
0.777  0.672  0.504    0.848  0.77  0.772 
  (2.26)  (4.26)  (3.8)   
(3.96)  (6.97)  (3.18)    (5.33)  (6.58)  (7.45)   46
indus3  0.354  0.441  0.605   
0.328  0.428  0.329    0.388  0.529  0.626 
  (4.87)  (7.88)  (8.31)   
(4.75)  (11.22)  (4.51)    (6.07)  (11.1)  (12.37) 
indus4  1.402  1.18  0.916   
0.957  0.995  0.694    0.498  0.751  0.78 
  (6.22)  (6.96)  (3.91)   
(6.18)  (11.3)  (5.22)    (2.76)  (6.18)  (6.47) 
indus5  0.626  0.699  0.883   
0.66  0.468  0.359    0.696  0.784  0.739 
  (4.82)  (6.53)  (7.16)   
(5.17)  (6)  (3.08)    (5.99)  (9.11)  (7.83) 
indus6  0.34  0.317  0.375   
0.407  0.407  0.256    0.288  0.465  0.461 
  (5)  (6.03)  (5.63)   
(6.17)  (11.13)  (3.69)    (4.46)  (10.03)  (9.78) 
indus7  0.6  0.597  0.921   
0.589  0.735  0.879    0.703  0.875  0.828 
  (4.51)  (5.89)  (7.48)   
(4.25)  (10.95)  (7.26)    (5.97)  (10.73)  (10.7) 
indus8  0.787  0.747  0.865   
0.656  0.718  0.666    0.724  0.798  0.779 
  (9.83)  (11.67)  (10.96)   
(8.03)  (16.53)  (8.09)    (9.88)  (14.29)  (14.51) 
indus9  0.355  0.29  0.59   
0.366  0.437  0.427    0.537  0.611  0.609 
  (4.08)  (4.09)  (6.98)   
(5.22)  (11.13)  (5.57)    (7.74)  (12.12)  (11.18) 
indus10  0.232  -0.07  1.175   
-0.126  0.729  0.355    -0.278  -0.171  -0.498 
  (1.31)  (-0.45)  (5.94)   
(-0.71)  (5.98)  (1.66)    (-0.88)  (-0.76)  (-2.37) 
Public  0.447  0.588  0.322   
0.353  0.357  0.269    0.367  0.341  0.299 
  (5.65)  (9.77)  (4.48)   
(6.96)  (12.99)  (5.34)    (7.22)  (9.57)  (7.4) 
Rural  -0.25  -0.208  -0.153   
0.279  -0.244  -0.176    -0.316  -0.278  -0.263 
  (-6.83)  (-7.58)  (-4.65)   
(-7.62)  (-12.83)  (-5.21)    (-9.66)  (-11.66)  (-10.99) 
Head  0.054  0.114  0.036   
0.015  0.076  0.088    0.08  0.07  0.048 
  (1.49)  (4.17)  (1.04)   
(0.38)  (3.9)  (2.53)    (2.38)  (2.91)  (2.07) 
Married  0.067  0.102  0.065   
0.039  0.12  0.125    0.119  0.072  0.083 
  (1.95)  (3.9)  (1.95)   
(1.09)  (6.5)  (3.71)    (3.81)  (2.95)  (3.13) 
Children  -0.003  -0.007  -0.003   
-0.029  -0.017  0.017    -0.003  0.003  -0.001 
  (-0.3)  (-0.98)  (-0.4)   
(-3.17)  (-3.59)  (-2.05)    (-0.37)  (0.44)  (-0.17) 
Union  0.313  0.236  0.169   
0.346  0.204  0.193    0.324  0.298  0.194 
  (8.57)  (8.81)  (5.05)   
(9.26)  (10.71)  (5.8)    (9.93)  (10.08)  (7.65) 
_cons  0.26  0.99  1.504   
0.402  1.286  2.239    0.656  0.272  2.033 
  (1.4)  (7.45)  (9.18)   
(2.27)  (14.27)  (12.93)    (4.14)  (10.08)  (17.33) 
Observations  3249  3249  3249   
4647  4647  4647    6954  6954  6954 
Rsquared  0.3064  0.3541  0.3570   
0.3570  0.4054  0.3942    0.3826  0.4181  0.3839 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 






























Education  -0.053  -0.02  -0.026    -0.021  -0.031  -0.019   
-0.009  -0.03  -0.034 
  (-4.62)  (-1.98)  (-2.32)    (-1.41)  (-2.63)  (-1.93)   
(-0.5)  (-2.62)  (-3.12) 
Education2  0.008  0.006  0.006    0.005  0.006  0.006   
0.005  0.006  0.006 
  (10.26)  (8.94)  (7.88)    (5.55)  (7.9)  (8.2)   
(4.93)  (8.95)  (7.85) 
Experience  0.008  0.013  0.007    0.009  0.009  0.004   
0.006  0.012  0.006 
  (2.05)  (3.73)  (1.87)    (2.11)  (2.13)  (1.08)   




-0.01  -0.01  0..048    -0.015  -0.005  0.006   
0.028  -0.008  0.004 
  (-1.52)  (-1.54)  (0.07)    (-1.72)  (-0.68)  (0.9)   
(0.03)  (-1.26)  (0.54) 
Tenure  0.019  0.013  0.009    0.015  0.013  0.012   
0.01  0.011  0.008 
  (10.37)  (8.06)  (5.03)    (7.11)  (7.75)  (7.89)   
(2.16)  (5.35)  (5.29) 
occ2  -0.385  -0.535  -0.755    -0.284  -0.46  -0.777   
-0.28  -0.417  -0.563 
  (-3.97)  (-4.66)  (-6.05)    (-2.78)  (-4.8)  (-8.56)   
(-2.75)  (-4.11)  (-6.89) 
occ3  -0.228  -0.331  -0.586    -0.275  -0.409  -0.671   
-0.401  -0.496  -0.651 
  (-2.67)  (-3.13)  (-5.17)    (-2.88)  (-4.95)  (-8.42)   
(-4.27)  (-5.64)  (-10.5) 
occ4  -0.559  -0.662  -0.885    -0.581  -0.63  -0.945   
-0.543  -0.621  -0.848 
  (-6.49)  (-6.34)  (-7.79)    (-5.97)  (-7.48)  (-11.99)   
(-5.78)  (-6.99)  (-13.22) 
occ5  -0.918  -0.957  -1.129    -0.883  -0.948  -1.16   
-0.871  -0.971  -1.088 
  (-10.08)  (-9.07)  (-9.91)    (-8.83)  (-10.96)  (-13.83)   
(-8.99)  (-10.92)  (-16.65) 
occ6  -0.749  -0.965  -1.137    -0.824  -0.839  -1.25   
-0.975  -1.3  -1.327 
  (-5.71)  (-7.25)  (-7.5)    (-4.9)  (-5.84)  (-9.72)   
(-5.19)  (-8.75)  (-11.95) 
occ7  -0.809  -1.108  -1.304    -0.803  -1.051  -1.291   
-0.927  -1.063  -1.402 
  (*7.93)  (-9.98)  (-10.85)    (-7.24)  (-10.87)  (-14.41)   
(-8.53)  (-10.7)  (-18.21) 
occ8  -0.831  -1.008  -1.22    -0.926  -1.047  -1.259   
-1.067  -1.182  -1.294 
  (-8.31)  (-9.14)  (-10.22)    (-8.46)  (-10.86)  (-13.65)   
(-8.62)  (-12.07)  (-16.45) 
occ9  -0.845  -1.036  -1.295    -0.9  -1.046  -1.345   
-0.926  -1.121  -1.352 
  (-9.21)  (-9.94)  (-11.69)    (-9.01)  (-12.3)  (-16.99)   
(-9.45)  (-12.68)  (-21.13) 
indus2  0.911  0.727  0.892    0.798  0.7  0.768   
0.62  0.655  1.312 
  (8.05)  (6.79)  (7.48)    (6.51)  (5.45)  (7.29)   
(4.59)  (5.95)  (10.48) 
indus3  0.351  0.485  0.622    0.249  0.43  0.58   
0.187  0.311  0.556 
  (6.67)  (11.03)  (12.37)    (4.11)  (8.45)  (7.29)   
(3.12)  (6.81)  (11.12) 
indus4  0.879  0.907  0.87    0.808  1.181  1.197   
0.901  0.758  1.311 
  (8.19)  (9.34)  (8.6)    (4.62)  (7.97)  (12.15)   
(6.67)  (7.58)  (11.89) 
indus5  0.55  0.553  0.639    0.25  0.241  0.369   
0.158  0.26  0.518 
  (6.37)  (7.64)  (7.74)    (2.52)  (2.71)  (5.12)   
(1.6)  (3.7)  (8.22) 
indus6  0.304  0.343  0.373    0.159  0.237  0.383   
0.029  0.095  0.273 
  (6.06)  (8.23)  (8.07)    (2.83)  (4.94)  (9.02)   
(0.44)  (2.2)  (6) 
indus7  0.818  0.878  1.047    0.901  0.907  0.924   
0.561  0.687  1.173 
  (9.26)  (12.19)  (10.75)    (9.59)  (10.46)  (15.05)   
(5.85)  (8.97)  (18.85) 
indus8  0.729  0.733  0.901    0.592  0.631  0.855   
0.434  0.532  0.728   48
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
2005  20
th Percentile  50
th Percentile  80
th Percentile 
Education  -0.066  -0.042  -0.051 
  (-4.77)  (-3.34)  (-2.9) 
Education2  0.008  0.008  0.009 
  (9.44)  (9091)  (7.2) 
Experience  0.01  0.007  0.003 
  (2.46)  (1.73)  (0.61) 
Experience2 (x10
2)  -0.018  -0.004  0.013 
  (-2.24)  (-0.53)  (1.19) 
Tenure  0.016  0.016  0.01 
  (7.11)  (8.82)  (3.75) 
occ2  -0.154  -0.354  -0.564 
  (-1.65)  (-4)  (-3.66) 
occ3  -0.228  -0.31  -0.448 
  (13.14)  (14.78)  (16.24)    (9.3)  (11.16)  (16.14)   
(6.03)  (10.54)  (13.17) 
indus9  0.454  0.445  0.616    0.47  0.621  0.772   
0.214  0.328  0.583 
  (8.01)  (9.32)  (11.57)    (7.05)  (11.37)  (15.1)   
(3.2)  (6.8)  (11.92) 
indus10  -0.195  -0.169  0.066    0.35  -0.121  -0.587   
0.383  -0.025  -0.357 
  (-0.87)  (-0.85)  (0.28)    (6.79)  (-2.87)  (-16.8)   
(4.92)  (-0.31)  (-2.49) 
Public  0.331  0.457  0.359    0.372  0.307  0.178   
0.424  0.357  0.237 
  (7.3)  (13)  (8.59)    (7.64)  (7.58)  (4.82)   
(9.43)  (9.98)  (6.27) 
Rural  -0.357  -0.291  -0.243    -0.341  -0.298  -0.25   
-0.332  -0.257  -0.206 
  (-13.36)  (-13.37)  (-9.84)    (-11.84)  (-11.96)  (-11.35)   
(-12.28)  (-12.54)  (-10.1) 
Head  0.075  0.025  0.029    0.003  0.023  0.081   
0.055  0.006  0.035 
  (2.78)  (1.09)  (1.18)    (0.11)  (0.92)  (3.77)   
(1.99)  (0.28)  (1.47) 
Married  0.161  0.099  0.077    0.083  0.058  0.076   
0.135  0.088  0.069 
  (6.35)  (4.56)  (3.16)    (3.03)  (2.32)  (3.38)   
(4.97)  (4.07)  (2.79) 
Children  -0.025  -0.019  -0.015    -0.039  -0.024  -0.024   
-0.022  -0.029  -0.012 
  (-3.66)  (-3.35)  (-2.23)    (-4.55)  (-3.49)  (-3.78)   
(-2.9)  (-4.77)  (-1.9) 
Union  0.314  0.226  0.145    0.34  0.187  0.099   
0.463  0.339  0.255 
  (11.25)  (9.72)  (5.21)    (11.57)  (7.06)  (4.2)   
(14.03)  (14.41)  (9.74) 
_cons  0.891  1.328  2.145    1.096  1.643  2.244   
1.141  0.709  2.351 
  (7.97)  (10.77)  (16.03)    (8.33)  (14.77)  (22.45)   
(8.55)  (15.64)  (25.78) 
Observations  6959  6959  6959    6614  6614  6614   
6925  6925  6925 
Rsquared  0.4060  0.4520  0.4251    0.3849  0.4524  0.4186   
0.3839  0.4433  0.4283   49
  (-2.63)  (-3.83)  (-3.43) 
occ4  -0.505  -0.601  -0.772 
  (-5.77)  (-7.5)  (-6.26) 
occ5  -0.785  -0.948  -1.017 
  (-8.63)  (-11.5)  (-8.06) 
occ6  -0.646  -0.955  -1.112 
  (-4.17)  (-6.58)  (-5.19) 
occ7  -0.883  -1.013  -1.167 
  (-8.42)  (-10.89)  (-8.18) 
occ8  -0.985  -0.997  -1.099 
  (-9.51)  (-10.55)  (-7.21) 
occ9  -0.756  -0.972  -1.177 
  (-8.18)  (-11.84)  (-9.46) 
indus2  0.44  0.615  0.882 
  (7.11)  (5.48)  (4.89) 
indus3  0.256  0.271  0.488 
  (3.52)  (5.3)  (6.41) 
indus4  0.595  0.584  0.903 
  (4.35)  (4.42)  (6.5) 
indus5  0.225  0.168  0.216 
  (2.68)  (2.15)  (2.1) 
indus6  0.059  0.091  0.2 
  (1.1)  (2.01)  (3.16) 
indus7  0.33  0.694  0.682 
  (3.04)  (8.12)  (6.19) 
indus8  0.363  0.395  0.599 
  (5.79)  (7.33)  (7.6) 
indus9  0.126  0.227  0.411 
  (2.04)  (7.33)  (5.35) 
indus10  0.647  0.292  0.718 
  (4.59)  (0.99)  (3.5) 
Public  0.439  0.362  0.306 
  (9.46)  (9.03)  (4.46) 
Rural  -0.266  -0.228  -0.196 
  (-9.91)  (-9.96)  (-5.91) 
Head  0.022  0.012  -0.003   50
  (0.76)  (0.5)  (-0.08) 
Married  0.09  0.063  0.052 
  (3.18)  (2.58)  (1.44) 
Children  -0.023  -0.023  -0.02 
  (-2.86)  (-3.26)  (-1.99) 
Union  0.378  0.269  0.154 
  (11.83)  (10.35)  (3.87) 
_cons  1.212  1.737  2.272 
  (10.32)  (15.91)  (14.04) 
Observations  6989  6989  6989 
Rsquared  0.3049  0.3953  0.4102 
Source: Own calculations from OHS 1995-1999 and LFS 2000-2005 
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